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COLOR-BLIND BUT NOT COLOR-DEAF: 
ACCENT DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION 
JASMINE B. GONZALES ROSE∞ 
 
ABSTRACT 
Every week brings a new story about racialized linguistic discrimination. It 
happens in restaurants, on public transportation, and in the street. It also happens 
behind closed courtroom doors during jury selection. While it is universally rec-
ognized that dismissing prospective jurors because they look like racial minorities 
is prohibited, it is too often deemed acceptable to exclude jurors because they 
sound like racial minorities. The fact that accent discrimination is commonly ra-
cial, ethnic, and national origin discrimination is overlooked. This Article criti-
cally examines sociolinguistic scholarship to explain the relationship between ac-
cent, race, and racism. It argues that accent discrimination in jury selection 
violates constitutional and statutory law and focuses on Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, equal protection under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, and 
the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. It situates accent dis-
crimination within the broader problems of juror language disenfranchisement 
and racial subordination in the U.S. courts. Finally, it advocates for inclusive 
practices, namely juror language accommodation. 
  
 
∞ Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh; Professor of Law, Boston University 
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On a New England autumn day, Ed Figueroa1 appeared for jury service at the 
Superior Court of New Britain, Connecticut. As a prospective juror, he was ques-
tioned about a variety of matters. He spoke enthusiastically about his career as a 
machinist, seven years in the union, and how much he enjoyed the varied demands 
of his work.2 He answered questions on a breadth of topics, including his experi-
ences with law enforcement and the justice system, as well as his hobbies and 
family life.3 When asked his opinion on the most valuable trait to pass along to 
his children, he responded, to “be honest.”4 The voir dire questioning went on for 
more than twenty minutes and was not particularly remarkable, except in one re-
spect: the judge was clearly uncomfortable with Figueroa’s accent. This discom-
fort would ultimately result in his disqualification.5 
Despite the lack of any indication that the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel 
or court recorder had trouble understanding Figueroa (or the reverse), the judge 
 
1.  “Ed Figueroa” is a pseudonym used in place of the redacted name in the record for prospec-
tive juror “E.F.” 
2.  State v. Gould (Gould I), 109 A.3d 968, 970–71 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015). 
3.  Id. at 970–72. 
4.  Id. at 971. 
5.  Id. at 972. 
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inquired about his English language background. “If I can just interrupt for a mo-
ment? [Mr. Figueroa], English is not your first language, is it?”6 “No,” responded 
Figueroa, who identified as Puerto Rican.7 He explained to the judge that he un-
derstood English very well.8 After follow-up questions about his English language 
background, Figueroa told the judge he understood his point: he has an accent.9 
The judge, apparently embarrassed by this realization, defensively interrupted 
him, saying, “No, no, I understand—I just want to—whenever anybody talks to 
me in an accent, and it’s not just Spanish, I often inquire whether they can under-
stand English well enough to be a juror. So, you’re comfortable doing that and 
that’s fine.”10 But, it was not fine. 
After answering over 100 questions in English appropriately—without coun-
sel or the court asking for clarification, without ellipses in the transcript for in-
comprehensible statements, without any suggestion that Figueroa’s accent made 
him difficult to understand—the judge excused him for cause: on the grounds that 
his “significant language barrier”11 would prevent him from fully participating as 
a juror in the case.12 Although the trial judge conceded that Figueroa certainly 
understood English,13 and despite the fact that approximately 45% of the jurisdic-
tion’s residents are Latinx (the vast majority of whom are Puerto Rican like 
Figueroa),14 the trial judge determined that his language abilities would hinder his 
communication with other jurors.15 This is troubling because accent itself does 
not indicate a lack of comprehension or communicative ability.16 
The Connecticut Court of Appeals, in a case styled Connecticut v. Gould, 
would later find Figueroa’s disqualification to be an abuse of discretion because 
there was no evidence in the record that he lacked the English language abilities 
needed to serve as a juror.17 Mr. Figueroa’s disqualification from jury service was 
 
6.  Id. at 971. 
7.  Id. at 970–71. 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id. at 972. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. at 970–73, 975. 
13.  Id. at 972. 
14.  American Community Survey Demographic and Housing Estimates: New Britain City, 




&y=2014&vintage=2014 [https://perma.cc/HM5P-YP6Q] (last visited Apr. 21, 2020). 
15.  Gould I, 109 A.3d at 972. 
16.  Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of Spanish, 21 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 17 (1992) (citing Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination 
Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991)). 
17.  Gould I, 109 A.3d at 977. 
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accent discrimination. As the trial judge excused Figueroa from jury service he 
told him, “[Y]ou’ve not been chosen as a juror. I don’t want you to think any of 
your answers were inappropriate or wrong. It’s just the way it worked out.”18 The 
judge was right—nothing Figueroa said was wrong. However, the way he pro-
nounced it was wrong. He spoke with a Hispanic accent.19  
Figueroa was disqualified from jury service that day because he spoke with 
an accent associated with the largest racialized minority population in the United 
States: Latinxs.20 This discrimination on the basis of Hispanic accent was not 
treated as race, ethnicity, or national origin discrimination. Although the appellate 
court found that the excusal of Figueroa on the basis of his language abilities was 
unfounded and made in error, the court did not recognize that the excusal was 
discriminatory.21 As such, the court refused to grant the defendant a new trial.22 
This reveals a shortcoming in our legal system. While it is impermissible to dis-
qualify jurors because they look like racial minorities, it is too often assumed to 
be acceptable to disqualify jurors because they sound like racial minorities. 
Judges’ and attorneys’ disregard for the fact that accent discrimination in jury 
selection often amounts to race, ethnic, and national origin discrimination is prob-
lematic for several reasons. Accent discrimination in jury selection often violates 
constitutional and statutory civil rights law. It prevents citizens from participating 
in the democratic self-governance function of jury service. Exclusion from jury 
service on the basis of accent relegates people of color that are perceived to be 
foreign, such as Latinxs, Asian Americans, Middle Eastern Americans, and—iron-
ically—indigenous Americans,23 to second class citizenship based upon the way 
they speak or, more accurately, the way that they are heard. The resultant elimi-
nation of people of color from juries defeats our legal system’s commitment that 
 
18.  Brief for Defendant-Appellant app. at A72, Gould I, 109 A.3d 968 (Conn. 2015) (No. 
19471). 
19.  The terms “Hispanic accent” or “Latinx accent” are used instead of “Spanish accent” be-
cause “Spanish accent” relates to accents associated with the country of Spain. Hispanic and Latinx 
accents reflect the racialized accents commonly associated with Latinx persons, who come from 
diverse ancestral and ethnic backgrounds, national origins, linguistic usages, identities, and nation-
alities—including from the United States. It should be noted that just as other racial groups are as-
sociated—accurately or inaccurately—with certain accents, such as African Americans having a 
“Black accent,” native-born American Latinxs may have domestic Latinx or Hispanic accents. 
20.  In 2019, Hispanic and Latinx people made up 18.3% of the population, with the next larg-
est racialized group (Black Americans) making up 13.4% of the population. United States Quick 
Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217 
[https://perma.cc/K4CY-2F9P] (last updated July 1, 2019). 
21.  Gould I, 109 A.3d at 972. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Indigenous Americans are often perceived as less “American” than white Americans. See 
generally Thierry Devos, Brian A. Nosek & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Aliens in Their Own Land? Implicit 
and Explicit Ascriptions of National Identity to Native Americans and White Americans (2007) (un-
published manuscript), https://www.projectimplicit.net/nosek/papers/DNB2007.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2LXQ-ZHP4]. 
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juries “be a body truly representative of the community.”24 When juries are not 
truly representative of the community, it delegitimizes the verdict and, in turn, the 
legal system as a whole.25 Unrepresentative juries present serious implications for 
criminal defendants and civil litigants, especially those of color. When judges and 
attorneys facilitate accent discrimination, they act on conscious and unconscious 
bias against racial, ethnic, and national origin minorities.26 This affects both the 
perceived and actual fairness of the courts.27 
Accent discrimination is just one form of racialized linguistic discrimination 
experienced in jury selection. Linguistic discrimination is the unfair treatment of 
interlocutors based upon their use of language.28 This includes the speaker’s na-
tive language, multilingual ability, grammaticality, syntax, and accent. Linguistic 
discrimination has long been a primary, but largely ignored, method of subordi-
nating Latinxs29 and other people of color (mis)associated with immigration. As 
Latinxs have become the largest racialized minority group in the United States,30 
it is imperative that we evaluate our legal system’s capacity to address racial dis-
crimination against this group in particular. Further, as racialized xenophobia is 
on the rise,31 our legal system must confront the ways in which discrimination 
manifests against all Americans perceived as foreign. Linguicism32 seems to be 
 
24.  Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). 
25.  See Leslie Ellis & Shari Siedman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Bat-
tering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI. KEN. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (2003) (citing Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural 
Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 
361 (1999)). 
26.  See Meghan Sumner, The Social Weight of Spoken Words, 19 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 238, 
238 (2015) (“It appears that voice cues activate special representations fast and early during the 
process of spoken language understanding . . . this early activation [] provides an outlet through 
which our social biases may modulate the allocation of cognitive resources, influencing the encoding 
and retention of auditory information.”). 
27.  Perea, supra note 16, at 50. 
28.  Flavia Albarello & Monica Rubini, The Role of Reduced Humanity in Producing Linguistic 
Discrimination, 41 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. BULL. 224, 225 (2015). 
29.  See Juan F. Perea, Buscando América: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Pro-
tect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1432–34 (2004). 
30.  Neal Conan, Hispanics Become America’s New Majority Minority, NPR (Apr. 18, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/04/18/135517137/hispanics-become-americas-new-majority-minority 
[https://perma.cc/Z2KJ-EYUV]; Hispanics in the US Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 6 2019) 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/20/us/hispanics-in-the-u-s-/index.html [https://perma.cc/PG4M-
VLJ8]. 
31.  See Katie Rogers & Nicholas Fandos, Trump Tells Congresswomen to ‘Go Back’ to the 
Countries They Came From, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/14/us/
politics/trump-twitter-squad-congress.html [https://perma.cc/V3Y7-VTJV]; News Release, US Rac-
ism on the Rise, UN Experts Warn in Wake of Charlottesville Violence, UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMM’R OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Page
s/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21975&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/X5SZ-DJA9]. 
32.  Linguicism is language-based bias and discrimination on the basis of language. Tove 
Skutnabb-Kangas, Linguicism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS (Carol A. Chapelle 
ed., 2015). More specifically, it refers to “ideologies, structures and practices which are used to 
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escalating or at least becoming more visible to the general public.33 Rarely a week 
goes by without a national news story covering Latinx people being harassed for 
simply speaking Spanish in public.34 This should be a cause of great concern since 
 
legitimate, effectuate, regulate and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both ma-
terial and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language.” Id. 
33.  See, e.g., Miami Woman Claims UPS Worker Kicked Her Out for Only Speaking Spanish, 
NBC NEWS MIAMI (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Miami-Woman-Claims-
UPS-Worker-Kicked-Her-Out-for-Only-Speaking-Spanish-471254344.html 
[https://perma.cc/3F75-YB42] (depicting a UPS employee asking Rebecca Prinstein to leave the 
store and using profanity); Nicole Acevedo, White Customer at Mexican Restaurant Swears at Span-
ish-Speaking Manager, NBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2019, 1:55 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/la-
tino/white-customer-mexican-restaurant-swears-spanish-speaking-manager-n973191 
[https://perma.cc/CP86-N5QW] (depicting a white woman yelling at a restaurant manager for speak-
ing Spanish, calling him a “rapist”); Christian Benavides, Students Walk Out After Teacher Orders: 
Speak ‘American,’ NBC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/students-
walk-out-after-teacher-tells-students-speak-american-n811256 [https://perma.cc/SN35-JD7W] 
(“The teacher told the students that U.S. soldiers are ‘not fighting for your right to speak Spanish – 
they’re fighting for your right to speak American.’”); Elizabeth Chuck, ‘Speak English, You’re in 
America,’ Woman Tells Latina Shoppers in Rant Caught on Camera, NBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/Latinx/speak-english-you-re-america-woman-tells-latina-shop-
pers-rant-n698776 [https://perma.cc/5FS6-GJ3Z] (showing a woman yelling at two Latinas in a 
checkout line at the Jefferson Mall in Louisville, Kentucky); Paul Foy, More Workers Claiming Job 
Discrimination Over Language, Accents, INS. J. (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.insurancejour-
nal.com/news/national/2012/12/04/272632.htm [https://perma.cc/RPZ3-N5VZ]; Jessica Levinson, 
Can New York Lawyer Aaron Schlossberg be Disbarred for His Racist Rant?, NBC NEWS (May 21, 
2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/can-new-york-lawyer-aaron-schlossberg-be-dis-
barred-his-racist-ncna876001 [https://perma.cc/XS3S-FTEB] (describing an incident in which a 
prominent New York attorney was seen ranting because restaurant workers were speaking to a cus-
tomer in Spanish); Josh Magness, He Yelled Racial Slurs at a Woman for ‘Speaking Immigrant,’ 
Video Shows, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.sacbee.com/news/nation-
world/national/article171518347.html [https://perma.cc/GR8D-7SKX] (illustrating an incident in 
which a man shopping at a Goodwill lashed out on a woman speaking Spanish); Mayra Moreno, 
Woman Told to Stop Speaking Spanish at Retirement Community, ABC13 HOUSTON (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://abc13.com/society/woman-told-to-stop-speaking-spanish-at-retirement-commu-
nity/5146223/ [https://perma.cc/YS64-6HAF] (describing an incident where the director of a retire-
ment community director sent a letter to one of the community’s residents, stating, “The United 
States of America is an English-speaking country and those who come to the United States or are 
born here should learn to speak the language… It is rude to sit in the lobby and speak Spanish.”); 
Katie Sartoris, Eustis Manager Told to ‘Go Back to Mexico’ for speaking Spanish, DAILY COM. (July 
9, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www.dailycommercial.com/news/20190709/eustis-manager-told-to-go-
back-to-mexico-for-speaking-spanish [https://perma.cc/EH6S-XX52] (showing two women who 
harassed a Puerto Rican Burger King manager for speaking Spanish and told him to go back to his 
“Mexican country”); Daniella Silva, Border Patrol Agent Detains Women for Speaking Spanish at 
Montana Gas Station, NBC NEWS (May 21, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/border-
patrol-agent-detains-women-speaking-spanish-montana-gas-station-n876096 
[https://perma.cc/D5D4-T4WH] (“When Suda, 37, asked if she and her friend were being racially 
profiled, the agent responded . . . ‘[i]t has nothing to do with that . . . [i]t’s the fact that it has to do 
with you guys speaking Spanish in the store, in a state where it’s predominantly English-speak-
ing.’”); Kristine Solomon, Gas Station Employee Berates Customer for Speaking Spanish in Viral 
Video Rant, YAHOO! Lifestyle (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/gas-station-em-
ployee-berates-customer-speaking-spanish-viral-video-rant-114548606.html 
[https://perma.cc/TL9P-W2UX] (showing a gas station employee yelling at a woman for speaking 
in Spanish and demanding to see proof of her citizenship). 
34.  See sources cited supra note 33. 
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the United States is home to the second largest population of Spanish-speakers in 
the world.35 
Accent discrimination in jury selection is not only an important issue in itself, 
but also a miner’s canary for broader racial injustice. The examination of juror 
language disenfranchisement elucidates the gravity of problems caused by lingui-
cism. It seeks to defeat the myth that language is merely a mutable race-neutral 
characteristic, undeserving of legal protection. The promise of assimilation and 
nativist rhetoric—that one can become fully American by learning English—is 
challenged by the reality that Latinxs and other people of color are too often barred 
from jury service on the basis of their language background, even when they are 
fluent in English. 
The fact that perceived-to-be-foreign U.S. citizen Latinxs and other people of 
color along the entire spectrum of English language abilities36 can be excluded 
from jury service on the basis of their perceived English language abilities reveals 
structural problems with more than jury selection procedures. It reveals the need 
to take a more realistic view of contemporary race discrimination and the way 
language plays a role in racism. Judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel should 
not be able to supplant constitutional and statutory civil rights protections by 
simply couching their racial preferences or assumptions about who deserves to be 
full citizens as language concerns. 
This Article builds upon my earlier work on “juror language disenfranchise-
ment.”37 It moves beyond the experience of the approximately 13 million limited-
English-proficient U.S. citizens who are denied the right to serve on a jury under 
English language requirements.38 It focuses on the many more millions of Amer-
ican citizens who are at risk of disqualification simply because they speak English 
with minority accents or are perceived as doing so. It also demonstrates the indi-
rect benefits that fluent English-speaking racial minority prospective jurors could 
gain from juror language accommodation programs in courts. 
Part II explores the relationship between accent, race, and racism. This pro-
vides a foundation for understanding how accent discrimination in jury selection 
can amount to racial, ethnic, and national origin discrimination. This exploration 
first examines sociolinguistic scholarship on accent discrimination through the 
 
35.  Stephen Burgen, U.S. Now Has More Spanish Speakers than Spain—Only Mexico Has 
More, THE GUARDIAN (June 29, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/29/us-sec-
ond-biggest-spanish-speaking-country [https://perma.cc/7JE3-MA2R]. 
36.  The spectrum of language abilities here includes limited-English-proficient citizens to 
fully bilingual or multilingual citizens—whether they have a “foreign” accent or not—and even 
monolingual English speakers who have minority accents. 
37.  Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Juror Language Disenfranchisement: A Call for Constitutional 
Remediation, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 811 (2014); Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Race Inequity Fifty Years 
Later: Language Rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 167 (2014); 
Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, The Exclusion of Non-English-Speaking Jurors: Remedying a Century 
of Denial of the Sixth Amendment in the Federal Courts of Puerto Rico, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
497 (2011). 
38.  Gonzales Rose, 65 HASTINGS L. J. at 814. 
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lens of critical race theory. Central to this discussion is how accent discrimination 
implicates both conscious and unconscious bias. Part III examines how accent dis-
crimination in jury selection violates constitutional and statutory law. The focus 
here is on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; equal protection under the 
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments; and the fair cross-section requirement of the 
Sixth Amendment. Part IV scrutinizes the structural implications of accent dis-
crimination in jury selection. It situates accent discrimination into the broader 
problems of juror language disenfranchisement and racial subordination in U.S. 
courts. It examines linguistic discrimination in jury service, dispels the assimila-
tion myth, and calls for remediation. 
II. 
ACCENT, RACE, AND SUBORDINATION 
While some courts have acknowledged that accent discrimination in jury se-
lection is impermissible because it is race discrimination,39 it appears that many 
courts treat accent as disconnected from race and allow racialized accent discrim-
ination to stand without consequences.40 In the jury selection process, lawyers too 
often strike potential jurors on the assumption that citizens who possess “heavy” 
or “thick” accents can be neutrally identified and excluded from jury service be-
cause they lack the requisite English language skills.41 However, a listener’s be-
liefs about a minority speaker’s accent and corresponding English language ability 
are frequently a matter of subjective racialized perception rather than objective 
reality. This Section seeks to explain the relationship between accent, race, and 
racial subordination. It endeavors to equip jurists, attorneys, scholars, and others 
to both articulate the connection between accent and race and recognize that accent 
discrimination is often a form of racial discrimination.  
 
39.  See, e.g., People v. Morales, 719 N.E.2d 261, 270–71 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that the 
state’s use of a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror on the basis that his “heavy” Hispanic accent 
would impair his ability to understand testimony was pretext for race discrimination). 
40.  See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 538 A.2d 210, 216 (Conn. 1988) (upholding exclusion of a 
Latinx prospective juror on the basis of his “highly perceptible accent” despite the juror’s ability to 
understand all the questions posed in voir dire); Gould I, 109 A.3d 968, 972 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015); 
Bernabeau v. State, 271 So.3d 979 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (affirming the trial court’s decision to 
strike three Afro-Caribbean Americans based upon the heaviness of their accents in the criminal trial 
of an Afro-Caribbean defendant). See also Farida Ali, Multilingual Prospective Jurors: Assessing 
California Standards Twenty Years After Hernandez v. New York, 8 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 236, 
253 (2013) (“These California decisions reveal the potential arbitrariness of decisions concerning 
challenges based on language proficiency. They illustrate that the practice allows courts to accept 
implausible ‘race-neutral’ explanations for challenges that, in reality, highly correlate with race.”); 
Perea, supra note 16, at 17, 50. 
41.  See, e.g., Corona v. Almager, Civ. No. 07-2117 BTM (NLS), 2008 WL 6926574, at *6–7 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2008). 
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A. Defining Accent and Situating it in the Structure of Race 
Accent is commonly defined as “a distinctive mode of pronunciation of a lan-
guage.”42 Contrary to popular belief, everybody has an accent.43 The notion that 
some people are accent-less is a myth.44 Spoken English45 is not standardized or 
uniform.46 In fact, “[a]ll spoken human language is necessarily and functionally 
variable.”47 As linguists recognize, Standard American English (“SAE”) is noth-
ing more than an abstraction or a hypothetical construct more accurately referred 
to by linguists as “idealized language.”48 Accent is a structured variation in lan-
guage pronunciation,49 and every English speaker in the United States speaks a 
variation of English.50 There is no original or objectively “correct” version of the 
spoken language.51 Rather, there is a widely recognized version—SAE—
associated with the racial majority, and that version is idealized. However, too 
often, the reality that SAE and SAE-accent are racially stigmatizing constructions 
is ignored.52 
Demarcation of accent depends on a variety of factors, such as geography, 
race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class.53 Linguists delineate two primary types 
of accent classifications: “L1” for native or first language accents and “L2” for 
foreign or second language accents.54 L1 U.S. English accents encompass all 
 
42.  Accent, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
43. ROSINA LIPPI-GREEN, ENGLISH WITH AN ACCENT: LANGUAGE, IDEOLOGY AND 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 44 (Routledge 2012); see also Tracey M. Derwing & Murray 
Munro, Putting Accent in its Place: Rethinking Obstacles to Communication, 42 LANGUAGE 
TEACHING 476, 476 (2009); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, 
and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1329 (1991). 
44.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 46. 
45.  Although this Article focuses on English, many of the concepts discussed would be appli-
cable to other languages. 
46.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 59–61. 
47.  Id. at 46. 
48.  Id. at 55. 
49.  See, e.g., Id. at 44–45. 
50.  WALT WOLFRAM & NATALIE SCHILLING, AMERICAN ENGLISH: DIALECTS AND VARIATION 3 
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 3d ed. 2016) (1998). 
51.  Moreover, “no accent, native or non-native, is inherently better than any other.” Derwing 
& Munro, supra note 43. 
52.  Jonathan Rosa & Nelson Flores, Unsettling Race and Language: Toward a Raciolinguistic 
Perspective, 46 LANGUAGE SOC’Y 621, 622 (2017) (“Since the project of modernity is premised on 
the stigmatization of racialized subjects across nation-state and colonial contexts, efforts to legiti-
mize racially stigmatized linguistic practices are fundamentally limited in their capacity to unsettle 
the inequities that they seek to disrupt.”); see also id. at 641 (arguing that by focusing on raciolin-
guistics, i.e. the co-naturalization of race and language, we are “not simply advocating linguistic 
pluralism or racial inclusion, but instead [are] interrogating the foundational forms of governance 
through which such diversity discourses deceptively perpetuate disparities by stipulating the terms 
on which perceived differences are embraced or abjected.”). 
53.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 44–45. 
54.  Id. at 46. 
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native varieties of spoken U.S. English,55 and L2 U.S. English accents “refer to 
the breakthrough of native language phonology” into the target language, spoken 
U.S. English.56 For perceived-to-be-foreign people of color, such as Latinxs and 
Asian Americans,57 the differentiation between L1 and L2 accents is blurred. For 
instance, L1 Latinxs and Asian Americans (and, again, remember that every na-
tive-born U.S. English speaker has an L1 accent) may be mistakenly perceived to 
possess L2 accents. 
Separate, but often associated with accent, is grammaticality. Grammaticality 
is a theoretical construct that “presupposes a native speaker with a linguistic com-
petence, which provides [them] with the linguistic knowledge of being able to (1) 
differentiate between grammatical sentences and ungrammatical sentences, and 
(2) to produce and interpret grammatical sentences.”58 In other words, grammati-
cality is the perceived accuracy of speech—whether particular spoken sentences 
are acceptable. Like accent, actual or perceived differences in grammaticality do 
not equal communicative effectiveness or ineffectiveness.59 Those with minority 
grammaticality are equally capable of constructing logical arguments and com-
municating effectively. However, variation or perceived lack of grammaticality 
by speakers of color, especially those perceived to be foreign, is often interpreted 
as a language barrier and an indication of an inability to speak or understand Eng-
lish adequately.60 Conversely, lack or divergence of grammaticality by white peo-
ple, while sometimes a class indicator, is more tolerated and not perceived as a 
barrier to communication.61 
SAE and non-accent are constructions that reflect and perpetuate racial hier-
archy. They refer to manners of speech and pronunciation associated with the ra-
cial majority: white people, especially those from the more privileged socioeco-
nomic classes.62 People in power are perceived as speaking normal, unaccented 
English. Speech that is different from this constructed norm is considered to be 
accented.63 The fact that SAE is not racially neutral is indicated by the fact that 
 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Ironically, this includes indigenous people of the (expanded) U.S. states, particularly Na-
tive Hawaiians and southwestern Native Americans, including Chicanxs of indigenous-descent. 
58. ANITA FETZER, RECONTEXTUALIZING CONTEXT: GRAMMATICALITY MEETS 
APPROPRIATENESS 12–13 (2004). 
59.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 10–11. 
60.  See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
61.  See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
62.  Jairo N. Fuertes, William H. Gottdiener, Helena Martin, Tracey C. Gilbert & Howard 
Giles, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Speakers’ Accents on Interpersonal Evaluations, 42 EUR. J. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 121 (2012); see also Howard Giles, Angie Williams, Diane M. Mackie & Fran-
cine Rosselli, Reactions to Anglo- and Hispanic-American-Accented Speakers: Affect, Identity, Per-
suasion, and the English Only Controversy, 15 LANGUAGE & COMM. 107, 107 (1995) (“A ubiquitous 
finding, worldwide, has been prestige-accented speakers are upgraded on traits of socioeconomic 
success (e.g. intelligence, ambition) relative to their nonstandard-speaking counterparts.”). 
63.  E.g., Matsuda, supra note 43, at 1343–44. 
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people of color who speak in this idealized manner are sometimes referred to as 
“sounding white.”64 Being able to speak “unaccented” SAE is often a prerequisite 
to employment, higher education, and other opportunities for social and economic 
mobility.65 It can also be a de facto juror prerequisite, as was the case for Figueroa. 
Not all accents are treated similarly: there are differences along racial lines. 
Accents associated with people of color who are perceived as foreign are associ-
ated with negative evaluations of the speakers’ intelligence, competence, ambi-
tion, education, and social class.66 These accents are perceived as unappealing and 
unintelligible.67 They are also perceived as more foreign—in other words, less 
American.68 In contrast, accents associated with lower-class white people, while 
considered less educated and sophisticated than middle- and upper-class majority 
accents, are nonetheless accepted as fundamentally “American.”69 While these 
accents may be belittled as folksy, quaint, and uneducated, and may even bar eco-
nomic opportunities, they are not perceived to inhibit the speaker’s communica-
tive abilities or the listener’s comprehension, or to be offensive. They are also not 
considered to make someone less of a citizen. Instead, such accents might be per-
ceived as particularly “American.”70 Further, European accents generally are not 
disfavored or considered incomprehensible.71 Accent is a social and racialized 
construction. The distinction among accents and the idealization of SAE serve to 
 
64.  See Daina C. Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation & Guilty Lib-
eralism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1085 (1994) (highlighting the consequences of not sounding white 
for Asian Americans); Kimberly A. Jones, Oreos, Coconuts, Apples, and Bananas: The Problem of 
Racial Self-Identification Amongst Young People of Color, 7 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 149, 160–61 
(2005) (describing the advantages and consequences to African American children who grow up in 
white neighborhoods and “sound white”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any 
Other Name?: On Being ‘Regarded As’ Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and 
Jamal are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1312 (2005) (citing Douglas S. Massey & Garvey Lundy, 
Use of Black English and Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets: New Methods and 
Findings, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 452, 455 (2001)) (“[I]n the same way that many people of color have 
changed their names to avoid discrimination, both conscious and unconscious, on the basis of their 
ethnic-sounding names, many people of color have intentionally used a ‘‘white-sounding’ voice, 
either one’s own or a friend’s, as one painful strategy . . . to get around some discrimination.’”); 
Dawn L. Smalls, Linguistic Profiling and the Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 579, 582 (2004) (de-
scribing a study in which a person of color had their friend call because she “sound[ed] like a white 
person”). See generally John Baugh, Linguistic Profiling, in BLACK LINGUISTICS: LANGUAGE, 
SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN AFRICA AND THE AMERICAS (Sinfree Makoni, Geneva Smitherman, 
Arnetha F. Ball & Arthur K. Spears eds., 2003). 
65.  See, e.g., Holly K. Carson & Monica A. McHenry, Effect of Accent and Dialect on Em-
ployability, 43 J. EMP. COUNS. 70, 80 (2006) (finding that those with “maximally perceived accent 
or dialect” received low employability ratings by human resources personnel). 
66.  Fuertes, Gottdiener, Martin, Gilbert & Giles, supra note 62, at 121. 
67.  Id. 
68.  See Terri Yuh-Lin, Hate Violence as Border Patrol: An Asian American Theory of Hate 
Violence, 7 ASIAN L. J. 69, n. 127 (2000) (citing Matsuda, supra note 43). 
69.  Id. 
70.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 253. 
71.  Id. at 73. 
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maintain the racialized social order. In this order, racial insiders dominate, and 
people of color are excluded from opportunities for socioeconomic advancement 
and, as will be discussed in more detail, full participation in the civil polity—
particularly jury service.  
B. Accent as External Markers of Race 
Accent and grammaticality are salient features by which people are racially 
categorized. Studies have demonstrated that listeners can identify a speaker’s so-
cially assigned race within seconds by merely hearing them speak.72 This is 
equally true for L2 (foreign) and L1 (domestic) accents.73 A seminal study from 
1984 demonstrated that L1 listeners could accurately detect L2 accents when pre-
sented with just 30 milliseconds of a certain phonetic sound produced by L2 speak-
ers.74 Prominent researchers, therefore, frequently highlight the salient nature of 
accent. One described accent as “[p]erhaps the most salient characteristic of an L2 
learner’s speech.”75 Because accent is so readily and quickly perceived, it be-
comes an immediate way for listeners to categorize the speaker. 
When categorization is salient, an individual will tend to differentiate between 
in-group and out-group as much as possible on as many dimensions as possible 
and this maximization of differences will tend to be negative for the out-group and 
favorable for the in-group. Numerous studies have demonstrated that an accent 
different from one’s own is an important indicator signaling that someone is dif-
ferent.76 
Perhaps even more importantly, lay listeners can similarly identify, and ulti-
mately “out group,” the race of L1 speakers. “Research has shown that most peo-
ple in the United States can identify the race of someone through a brief phone 
 
72.  E.g., Jeffrey D. Dillman, New Strategies for Old Problems: The Fair Housing Act at 40, 
57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 197, 202 n.26 (citing Thomas Purnell, William Idsardi & John Baugh, 
Perceptual and Phonetic Experiments on American English Dialect Identification, 18 J. LANGUAGE 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 10, 10–14 (1999)); Clifford v. Chandler, 333 F.3d 724, 731 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(discussing Stanford University study of 421 students who correctly identified Black male voices 
88% of the time); Julie H. Walton & Robert F. Orlikoff, Speaker Race Identification from Acoustic 
Cues in the Vocal Signal, 37 J. SPEECH & HEARING RES. 738, 738–45 (1994). 
73.  See sources cited supra note 72. 
74.  James Emil Flege, The Detection of French Accent by American Listeners, 76 J. 
ACOUSTICAL SOC’Y AM. 692, 704 (1984). 
75.  Tracy M. Derwing, Marrian J. Rossiter & Murray J. Munro, Teaching Native Speakers to 
Listen to Foreign-Accented Speech, 23 J. MULTILINGUAL & MULTICULTURAL DEV. 245, 246 (2010). 
76.  Mary Jiang Bresnahan, Rie Ohashi, Wen Ying Liu, Reiko Nebashi, & Sachiyo Morinaga 
Shearman, Attitudinal and Affective Response Toward Accented English, 22 LANGUAGE & COMM. 
171, 172 (2002); see also Marko Dragojevic, Dana Mastro, Howard Giles & Alexander Sink, 
Silencing Nonstandard Speakers: A Content Analysis of Accent Portrayals on American Primetime 
Television, 45 LANGUAGE SOC’Y 59, 61 (2016) (“Language attitudes have been theorized to result 
from two sequential cognitive processes: categorization and stereotyping. First, listeners use 
linguistic cues, such as a speaker’s accent, to make an inference about speakers’ social group 
membership(s) (e.g. ethnicity, social class). Second, they attribute to speakers’ stereotypic traits 
associated with those inferred group memberships. In other words, language attitudes reflect 
people’s stereotypes about different linguistic groups.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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conversation, often after hearing only several words.”77 In fact, it sometimes only 
takes a second of hearing a syllable or two for the race of the speaker to be iden-
tified.78 For instance, in a study by Julie Walton and Robert Orlikoff, one-second 
acoustic samples of vowel sounds of Black and white men were played to listeners 
who were able to “correctly” determine the race of the speaker the majority of the 
time.79 Courts recognize the ability of laypeople to identify a person’s race or na-
tional origin through voice. The majority of jurisdictions permit witnesses “to tes-
tify that an individual’s voice or manner of speech sounded like the speaker was 
of a particular race [or] ethnic background, [or] geographic area.”80 Accent is such 
a well-established and ostensibly reliable racial characteristic and identifier that it 
is given evidentiary value in our legal system. 
C. Accent as Core to Internal Identity 
Not only is accent a way that people are racially classified or identified, but 
accent is also central to one’s internal racial identity and other axes of self-identity. 
Variation in language is used to “construct ourselves as social beings, to signal 
who we are, and who we are not and do not want to be.”81 Social identities are 
often marked by linguistic variants, including accent.82 Empirical studies support 
these linkages.83  
Further, accent as external and internal markers of identity mutually reinforce 
each other. For instance, a 2005 study established “a link between the degree of 
accentedness of learner speech and the way others perceive their ethnic group 
 
77.  See sources cited supra note 72. 
78.  See Walton & Orlikoff, supra note 72. 
79.  See id. 
80.  CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, Voice Identification by Lay Witnesses, Jurors 
and Judges § 38:11, in WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING (2016); see, e.g., Clifford v. Chandler, 
333 F.3d 724, 731 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting “the notion that mere identification of an individual’s 
race by his voice will always result in unconstitutional prejudice”). 
81.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 66; see also Matsuda, supra note 43, at 1329 (“Your accent 
carries the story of who you are—who first held you and talked to you when you were a child, where 
you have lived, your age, the schools you attended, the languages you know, your ethnicity, whom 
you admire, your loyalties, your profession, your class position: traces of your life and identity are 
woven into your pronunciation, your phrasing, your choice of words. Your self is inseparable from 
your accent. Someone who tells you they don’t like the way you speak is quite likely telling you that 
they don’t like you.”). 
82.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 45; see also Beatrice Bich-Dao Nguyen, Accent Discrimi-
nation and the Test of Spoken English: A Call for an Objective Assessment of the Comprehensibility 
of Nonnative Speakers, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (1993) (“Every individual has an accent that 
‘carries the story’ of who she is and that may identify her race, national origin, profession, and soci-
oeconomic status.” (citing Matsuda, supra note 43, at 1329)). 
83.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Gatbonton, Pavel Trofimovich, & Michael Magid, Learners’ Ethnic 
Group Affiliation and L2 Pronunciation Accuracy: A Sociolinguistic Investigation, 39 TESOL Q. 
489, 497 (2005); Pavel Trofimovich & Larisa Turuševa, Ethnic Identity and Second Language 
Learning, 35 ANN. REV. APPLIED LINGUISTICS 234, 237–39 (2015). 
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affiliation.”84 The results also shed light upon the resulting tension for language 
learners and bilingual speakers, who must navigate “the tug and pull of their two 
reference groups.”85 This may even lead L2 and bilingual speakers, at times, to 
aim for “a lower level of . . . pronunciation accuracy . . . recognizing the need to 
maintain identification with the home group and being aware of the social costs of 
not doing so.”86 In other words, some speakers may emphasize their accent as a 
means to demonstrate their identity, particularly within their own communities. 
Many people see their accent as a means to maintain their social identity. Several 
studies have confirmed this phenomenon, in which bi- or multilingual individuals 
speak in a particular way to assimilate or distance themselves from identifying or 
being identified with certain groups.87 L1 monolingual English speakers of color 
often do the same to signal their “ingroup” relationship with their heritage group.88 
The implications of the link between accent and identity are real, and “[w]hen an 
individual is asked to reject their own language, we are asking them to drop alle-
giances to the people and places that define them.”89 
This appears particularly true for Latinx people. Even though not all Latinxs 
have Hispanic accents, a Hispanic accent can be central to one’s Latinx race, eth-
nicity, and national origin. For instance, linguists have observed that “Puerto Ri-
cans are racialized through attention to their ‘linguistic disorder’ [when speaking 
English]. Use of nonstandard language becomes a sign of nonwhite race.”90 Spe-
cifically, their language and accent “serve as racial markers [even] when racial 
differences are not readily apparent.”91 Similarly, it is recognized that for Latinxs 
of Mexican heritage, language usage and expression are primary markers of Mex-
ican or Chicanx identity.92 This is true for many Spanish-dominant, English-Span-
ish bilingual, and monolingual English Latinx speakers.93 The central connection 
between language (including accent) and racial identity likely similarly applies to 
many other populations of color.94 People often express who they are racially and 
ethnically through their manner of speech. 
 
84.  Gatbonton, Trofimovich & Magid, supra note 83, at 497. 
85.  Id. at 505. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Trofimovich & Turuševa, supra note 83, at 237. 
88.  Jonathan Rosa, From Mock Spanish to Inverted Spanglish: Language Ideologies and the 
Racialization of Mexican and Puerto Rican Youth in the United States, in RACIOLINGUISTICS: HOW 
LANGUAGE SHAPES OUR IDEAS ABOUT RACE 65, 70–73 (H. Samy Alim, John R. Rickford & Arnetha 
F. Ball, eds., 2016). 
89.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 66. 
90.  ELIZABETH M. ARANDA, EMOTIONAL BRIDGES TO PUERTO RICO: MIGRATION, RETURN 
MIGRATION, AND THE STRUGGLES OF INCORPORATION 108 (2007) (citing BONNIE URCIUOLI, 
EXPOSING PREJUDICE: PUERTO RICANS EXPERIENCES OF LANGUAGE, RACE, AND CLASS (1996)). 
91.  Id. 
92.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 266. 
93.  Rosa, supra note 88, at 71–72. 
94.  Alice Bloch & Shirin Hirsch, “Second Generation” Refugees and Multilingualism: 
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D. From Racial Characterization and Identification to Subordination 
Similar to other salient human characteristics, such as skin color, hair color 
and texture, and other phenotypes, accent is used to classify and group people 
racially. Moral traits and stereotypes are then attached to the characteristics used 
to racially categorize people. For example, dark skin pigmentation, dark tightly 
curled hair, and certain facial features are used to racially classify people as 
Black.95 These characteristics are then unjustifiably associated with moral and 
character traits, such as being dangerous or criminally-inclined.96 For people of 
color perceived as foreign, such as Latinxs and Asian Americans, linguistic char-
acteristics are compounded with other external markers like physical appearance. 
These linguistic characteristics, such as accent, are unfairly burdened with moral 
and character associations. For instance, for Latinxs, the use of Spanish or 
Spanglish—even sporadic words97—or speaking with a Hispanic accent is per-
ceived to indicate negative qualities, such as being “‘dirty,’ un-American, abusive, 
foul, threatening, uneducated, or offensive.”98 Hispanic linguistic traits become 
the focus and target of assumptions that are symptomatic of anti-Latinx racism.99 
For instance, although U.S. citizens by birth,100 Puerto Ricans are commonly 
made to feel like outsiders and discriminated against because of their accent.101 
Chicanxs and other Latinx people born in the United States are also often made to 
feel like outsiders.102 
While accent can be a source of racial discrimination against all people of 
color, such as discrimination against African Americans calling to inquire about 
housing or advertised jobs, accent of racial minorities perceived to be foreign takes 
 
Identity, Race and Language Transmission, 40 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 2444, 2455 (2016) (finding, 
in a study based on 45 qualitative interviews with groups of second-generation refugees from Sri 
Lanka, Turkey, and Vietnam, that “the importance of speaking the heritage language was almost 
always stressed by interviewees . . . [l]anguage was a mechanism through which identity, culture 
and relationships to family and social networks were claimed and defined.”). 
95.  Gonzales Rose, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV., supra note 37, at 173. 
96.  Id. 
97.  For instance, Zach Rubio, a native-born U.S. citizen of Mexican heritage was told to “Go 
back to Mexico” and suspended from high school in Kansas City for saying “no problema” instead 
of “no problem” to a fellow student in the hallway during a break. Rubio v. Turner Unified Sch. 
Dist. No. 202, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1298 (D. Kan. 2006); T.R. Reid, Spanish at School Translates 
to Suspension, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2005, at A3, ProQuest Central, 409921108. 
98.  Gonzales Rose, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV., supra note 37, at 173. 
99.  Giles, Williams, Mackie & Rosselli, supra note 62, at 107. 
100.  8 U.S.C. § 1402 (2018). 
101.  See ARANDA, supra note 90, at 108–09, 116, 126, 140; MARÍA E. PÉREZ Y GONZÁLES, 
PUERTO RICANS IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (2000) (describing how Puerto Ricans have faced housing 
discrimination based on their accent). 
102.  Rosa, supra note 88, at 70–73 (describing how Latinx people’s language practices navi-
gate the complex social and cultural pressures of “hegemonic whiteness and English dominance” in 
the United States, where “monolingual English speech [was] a sign of deviance . . . or selling out” 
to their community, but “monolingual Spanish speech was often viewed as uncool or a barrier to full 
participation in everyday school life.”). 
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on unique qualities related to presumptions about citizenship.103 Latinxs’ and 
Asian Americans’ actual or perceived accents are often interpreted to indicate lack 
of English language ability and the presence of communication barriers,104 as well 
as alien-ness.105 This is not surprising considering the prominence of racial stere-
otypes that characterize these groups as foreign.106 What is surprising about the 
racialized perceptions of Latinxs and Asian Americans—as well as other people 
of color perceived to be foreign—is that reliance on these racial stereotypes and 
biases can actually make otherwise comprehensible speech seem incomprehensi-
ble to listeners.107 
E. Critical Race Analysis of Accent and Comprehensibility 
The following four observations are well-established in sociolinguistic schol-
arship: (1) Accent and associated grammaticality are salient characteristics used 
to categorize people.108 (2) L2 accents may be mistakenly perceived when the 
speaker is presumed to be a racial minority.109 (3) Some native English speakers 
are resistant to communication with persons whom they perceive to have L2 ac-
cents.110 And finally, (4) even when such speakers’ accents do not affect intelli-
gibility, native-English-speaking listeners may actually experience diminished 
perceived comprehensibility (the subjective perception of understanding the 
speakers’ words).111 Examination of these linguistic phenomena under the lens of 
 
103.  See, e.g., Dillman, supra note 77 (reviewing research showing that most people can iden-
tify race through a brief phone conversation and that some housing providers use that identification 
to screen and not return calls of individuals who “sound African American” or “sound foreign”); 
Patricia Rice, Linguistic Profiling: The Sound of Your Voice May Determine if You Get That Apart-
ment or Not, THE SOURCE (Feb. 2, 2006), https://source.wustl.edu/2006/02/linguistic-profiling-the-
sound-of-your-voice-may-determine-if-you-get-that-apartment-or-not/ [https://perma.cc/XG6S-
DJFU] (reviewing a study showing that when calling businesses in response to ads, companies “don’t 
return calls of those whose voices seem to identify them as black or Latino” and that the “[l]ack of 
response or refusal to offer face-to-face appointments was higher for Latinos than for African-Amer-
icans”). 
104.  See, e.g., Andrew R. Timming, The Effect of Foreign Accent on Employability: A Study 
of the Aural Dimensions of Aesthetic Labour in Customer-Facing & Non-Customer-Facing Jobs, 31 
WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 409, 423 (2017) (discussing the “hierarchy of accents” in employment con-
texts, with “the English and American voices clustered at the top, the Chinese and Mexican voices 
clustered at the bottom and the Indian voices hovering in the middle.”). 
105.  Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, ‘Foreignness,’ and Racial 
Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 268–78 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Under Con-
struction: LatCrit Consciousness, Community, and Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1122–24 (1997). 
106.  Saito, supra note 105, at 268–78; Valdes, supra note 105, at 1122–24. 
107.  See Donald L. Rubin, Nonlanguage Factors Affecting Undergraduates’ Judgments of 
Nonnative English-Speaking Teaching Assistants, 33 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 511 (1992). 
108.  See sources cited supra note 72. 
109.  See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 107. 
110.  See, e.g., Derwing, Rossiter & Munro, supra note 75, at 247–48. 
111.  See generally Murray J. Munro & Tracey M. Derwing, Foreign Accent, Comprehensibil-
ity, and Intelligibility in the Speech of Second Language Learners, 49 LANGUAGE LEARNING 285 
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critical race theory reveals the relationship between race, racism, and accent. Spe-
cifically, it evinces three points. First, whether a person is perceived to have an 
accent is closely related to race. Second, a speaker’s race impacts whether a lis-
tener finds them comprehensible. Third, accent discrimination is a result of insider 
racial bias and ultimately furthers white supremacy. 
Although accent is often treated as an objective characteristic, by the courts 
and laypeople alike, whether a person is perceived as having an L2 or “foreign” 
accent and the extent of that accent is subjective and related to the speaker’s race. 
This was strikingly demonstrated by a study conducted by Donald Rubin in 
1992.112 In this study, undergraduate native English speakers listened to recorded 
lectures of a native English speaker raised in Ohio.113 During the lecture a photo-
graph was projected to represent the female lecturer.114 There were two possible 
photographs. To avoid confounding ethnicity with other variables, each was sim-
ilar in size, hair, dress, setting, pose, and other characteristics.115 The difference 
was that one woman was Caucasian and the other woman was of Chinese de-
scent.116 Although the lecture was recorded by the same Midwestern native Eng-
lish speaker, students who thought the lecture was delivered by the woman who 
looked Asian were more likely to conclude that the lecturer spoke with a foreign 
accent.117 Merely thinking that the speaker was Asian caused the listener to erro-
neously hear a foreign accent. This is not simply a mistake; this is a manifestation 
of how racialization and racism play out against Asian Americans and Latinxs, as 
well as other people of color associated with immigration.118 
For Latinxs and Asian Americans, their racialized experience of “othering” 
and subordination centers on notions of foreignness and language, including ac-
cent.119 Asian Americans and Latinxs are perceived to be foreign, irrespective of 
 
(1999). 
112.  Rubin, supra note 107; LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 92–94 (citing Rubin, supra note 
107); Alejandrina Cristia, Amanda Seidl, Charlotte Vaughn, Rachel Schmale, Ann Bradlow & Car-
oline Floccia, Linguistic Processing of Accented Speech Across the Lifespan, 3 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 
479 (2012) (citing Rubin, supra note 107); Kristina D. Curkovic, Accent and the University: Accent 
as Pretext for National Origin Discrimination in Tenure Decisions, 26 J.C. & U.L. 727, 743–44 
(2000) (citing Rubin, supra note 107). 
113.  Rubin, supra note 107, at 514–16. 
114.  Id. at 514–15. 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. at 514. 
117.  Id. at 519. 
118.  Other matched-guise studies show that Latinx accents tend to affect employment deci-
sions and perceptions in the workplace. See, e.g., Megumi Hosoda, Lam T. Nguyen, & Eugene F. 
Stone-Romero, The Effect of Hispanic Accents on Employment Decisions, 27 J. MANAGERIAL 
PSYCHOL. 347, 356 (2012) (“[C]ompared to an applicant with a Standard American-English accent, 
one with a Mexican-Spanish accent was at a disadvantage when applying for a high-status job (i.e. 
software engineer).”). 
119.  ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 122 (1998); 
Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination, 85 CAL. 
L. REV. 1395, 1402, 1408 (1997) (“foreignness is used as a proxy for exclusion from the national 
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whether they are native-born or immigrants.120 No matter how many generations 
an Asian American’s family has lived in the United States,121 or even if a Chi-
canx’s ancestors were indigenous to the Southwest prior to 1848 when the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo made it part of the United States,122 or if they are from 
Puerto Rico which has been a U.S. territory since 1898,123 they will continue to 
be considered foreigners. Part of the native-foreign dichotomy is that those 
deemed foreigners not only look different, but they also sound different. Thus, it 
is not surprising that students in the Rubin study who thought the lecturer was 
Asian—and thus foreign—assumed that she also sounded foreign. Although lin-
guists make clear distinctions between L1 and L2 accents as native (first-lan-
guage) and foreign (second-language) accents respectively, the truth is that for 
racial groups perceived to be foreign, L1 accents can be mistaken as L2 accents.124 
Thus, the Linguistics literature concerning native English-speaking listeners’ 
communicative treatment of people with L2 accents should be understood to apply 
to U.S. citizen native-English-speaking Latinxs and Asian Americans. 
A speaker’s race not only prompts listeners to perceive nonexistent accents, 
but can also result in listeners finding the speaker incomprehensible. In the Rubin 
study, students shown the photograph of the Asian American woman did not 
simply perceive a foreign accent; they also found the speech to be less understand-
able and experienced diminished comprehension.125 Students shown the photo-
graph of an Asian American woman scored lower on the comprehension test than 
students shown the photo of the white woman.126 This demonstrates that a speaker 
of color’s race coupled with implicit racial bias can result in the listener perceiving 
the speaker to have a foreign accent. From that (mis)perception, the listener 
 
community” since “the identification of American [is] with White”) (citation omitted) (quoting Wal-
ter Benn Michaels, The Souls of White Folk, in LITERATURE AND THE BODY: ESSAYS ON POPULATIONS 
AND PERSONS 185, 188 (Elaine Scarry ed., 1988)); Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit-Fit to 
Dismantle That Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 302 (2000); Gonzales Rose, 6 ALA. C.R. 
& C.L. L. REV., supra note 37, at 172. 
120.  See LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 287–88; Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Ra-
cial Double Helix: Watson, Crick, and Brown v. Board of Education (Our No-Bell Prize Award 
Speech), 47 HOW. L.J. 473, 489–90 (2004). 
121.  Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans and Latinos as ‘Foreigners,’ and 
Social Change: Is the Law the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REV. 347, 355 (1997). 
122.  Id.; LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 287–88. 
123.  See Howard Jordan, Immigrant Rights: A Puerto Rican Issue, N. AM. CONG. ON LATIN 
AM. (Sept. 25, 2007), https://nacla.org/article/immigrant-rights-puerto-rican-issue 
[https://perma.cc/8WH8-G63Z] (explaining that although Puerto Ricans have legally been U.S. cit-
izens since 1917, many face perceptions of “illegality” along with other Latinx populations). 
124.  See, e.g., LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, 45–46; Derwing, Rossiter & Munro supra note 75, 
at 248; see generally Derwing & Munro, supra note 43 (using the distinctions L1 and L2); Sara 
Kennedy & Pavel Trofimovich, Intelligibility, Comprehensibility, and Accentedness of L2 Speech: 
The Role of Listener Experience and Semantic Context, 64 CAN. MOD. LANGUAGE REV. 459 (2008) 
(using the distinctions L1 and L2). 
125.  Rubin, supra note 107, at 527. 
126.  Id. at 518–19. 
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becomes resistant to listening and—due to this unconscious resistance—less mo-
tivated and thereby less likely to understand the speaker as well as if the speaker 
were white. 
Sociolinguists have demonstrated that listeners are “particularly susceptible 
to the cultural stereotypes [they] have absorbed” in terms of speech evaluation: 
“[l]ow-status accents will sound foreign and unintelligible [while] [h]igh-status 
accents will sound clear and competent.”127 Whether an accent is of low or high 
status mirrors society’s racial hierarchy. Hispanic and Asian accents are consid-
ered low status,128 while European accents, such as French or German, are con-
sidered high status.129 And remember, “[t]he degree of accent is not necessarily 
relevant to [discriminatory] behaviors; where no accent exists, stereotype and dis-
crimination can sometimes manufacture one in the mind of the listener.”130 
The failure to understand people of color with perceived or actual L2 accents 
is due, in large part, to three related issues: (1) the listener’s refusal to carry their 
own communicative burden; (2) racial stereotypes; and (3) racial bias. The failure 
to understand is often not due to the speaker’s actual English language abilities or 
linguistic difference. Minority accents and grammaticality do not necessarily de-
termine whether speakers are comprehensible.131 Rather, the majority listener’s 
own attitudes about race and communication with people of color perceived to be 
foreign are actually determinative of whether the listener will understand the mi-
nority speaker.132 
Studies, such as Derwing and Munro’s 1999 inquiry into links between accent 
and intelligibility, have broken down long-held assumptions that native-like pro-
nunciation is necessary for effective and intelligible communication.133 This erro-
neous assumption is perpetuated despite “there [being] no indication that reduction 
 
127.  Matsuda, supra note 43, at 1355. 
128.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 85. 
129.  “For the majority of Americans, French accents are positive ones[.] Many have strong 
pejorative reactions to Asian accents[.]” LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 73 (discussing studies show-
ing that Black, white, and Latinx students all found Spanish-accented English to be lacking in pres-
tige and inappropriate for a classroom setting). 
130.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 251. 
131.  Id. at 251. 
132.  Id. (“[W]here no accent exists, stereotype and discrimination can sometimes manufacture 
one in the mind of the listener.”); Ulrik Lyngs, Emma Cohen, Wallisen Tadashi Hattori, Martha 
Newson & Daniel T. Levin, Hearing in Color: How Expectations Distort Perception of Skin Tone, 
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE, Oct. 13, 2016 (finding that indi-
vidual faces were perceived to be darker in skin tone when paired with an accent associated with 
low socioeconomic status); Yi Zheng & Arthur G. Samuel, Does Seeing an Asian Face Make Speech 
Sound More Accented?, 79 ATTENTION, PERCEPTION, & PSYCHOPHYSICS 1841 (2017) (finding that 
listeners had more difficulty interpreting speech when it was paired with a photo of an Asian face 
rather than a white face, although the effect was less pronounced when listeners watched dubbed 
videos). 
133.  See generally Munro & Derwing, supra note 111. 
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of accent necessarily entails increased intelligibility.”134 In fact, research shows 
that perceived accentedness is largely distinct from—and thus does not necessary 
correlate with—comprehensibility and intelligibility.135 One study established 
that, generally speaking, native English listeners “found the nonnative [speech] to 
be highly intelligible, [and] more than half of the transcriptions [of nonnative 
speech] received intelligibility scores of 100%,” even where listeners scored the 
speech as “heavily accented.”136 Otherwise stated, even heavy accents do not 
translate into unintelligible communication. Rather, closed minds result in closed 
ears. 
Despite the fact that accent does not necessarily translate into decreased in-
telligibility, listeners will often erroneously report that it does. This expectation-
matching is likely due to the phenomenon of confirmation bias.137 The fault often 
lies with the “intolerant, often monolingual interlocutors [who] fail to understand 
even the clearest L2 speaker, simply because they have made up their minds that 
they can’t understand accented speech.”138 Regularly, when confronted by per-
ceived or actual L2 accented English, native speakers of U.S. English “often feel 
perfectly empowered to reject their [communicative] responsibility, and to de-
mand that [the L2 speaker] carry the burden in the communicative act.”139 
For instance, one study showed that “if listeners merely thought that a person 
might be from a different language background, they understood less of what was 
said.”140 Based on this finding, researchers urge that the “responsibility for suc-
cessful communication should be shared across interlocutors,”141 since a listener’s 
assumptions may have a significant effect on comprehension of someone with an 
L2 or perceived L2 accent. In other words, although the L2 speaker can communi-
cate sufficiently in English, the native English speaker is not willing to work to-
ward mutual comprehension.142 Such listeners overstate the lack of comprehensi-
bility of those with L2-accented speech143 and find the attempt to understand not 
worth the investment of time or effort. “In many cases . . . breakdown of 
 
134.  Id. at 287 (emphasis removed). 
135.  Derwing & Munro, supra note 43, at 479. 
136.  Munro & Derwing, supra note 111, at 302. 
137.  Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 
2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998) (“Confirmation bias . . . connotes the seeking or interpreting 
of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis at hand.”); see 
also Patreese D. Ingram, Are Accents One of the Last Acceptable Areas for Discrimination?, 47 J. 
EXTENSION, 1, 2 (2009) (“[W]e are so conditioned to expect an accent that we sometimes hear one 
when none is present. People who look different are expected to sound different, even if they are 
monolingual native English speakers.”). 
138.  Derwing & Munro, supra note 43, at 486. 
139.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 72. 
140.  Derwing & Munro, supra note 43, at 486 (citing Rubin, supra note 107). 
141.  Id. 
142.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 72. 
143.  Derwing & Munro, supra note 43, at 479–80. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678263
COLOR-BLIND BUT NOT COLOR-DEAF 5/26/20  8:31 PM 
2020] COLOR-BLIND BUT NOT COLOR-DEAF 329 
communication is due not so much to accent as it is to negative social evaluation 
of the accent in question, and a rejection of the communicative burden.”144 More-
over, studies show “listeners and speakers will work harder to find a communica-
tive middle ground and foster mutual intelligibility when they are motivated, so-
cially and psychologically, to do so.”145 Race and unconscious racial bias play a 
role in whether the listener and speaker are motivated to communicate. 
Often, majority speakers do not understand “accented” people of color be-
cause they are reluctant to communicate with people they perceive to have L2 
accents. Majority-accented persons’ unwillingness to try to communicate with mi-
nority-accented people is due, at least in part, to racial bias—much of which is 
implicit—about who can communicate effectively and who is worth communi-
cating with. Due to racial hierarchy in the United States, people of color with ac-
tual or perceived minority accents are less valued, and accordingly majority per-
sons may be less motivated, socially or otherwise, to fully communicate with 
them. Further, racial stereotypes about Latinxs and Asian Americans are that they 
are foreigners who do not speak English well or at all.146 Conversely, white people 
are presumed to be English speakers and, even if they are not native speakers, to 
be able to speak English sufficiently. Here, belief makes reality. If the listener 
believes that the speaker is worthy and capable of communication, then they will 
make the effort to make that a reality. 
Failure to comprehend minority-accented people of color could also be re-
lated to racism in other ways. In cases of overt or aversive racism, the minority 
accent itself may cause discomfort in the listener or make them less likely to value 
the conversation and listen. This leads to a lack of familiarity with people who 
look and sound different.  
Research indicates that “familiarity with L2 speech improves comprehen-
sion.”147 For example, participants in one study were more confident in communi-
cating with L2 accented speech after limited exposure and explanation of some of 
the phonological differences of Vietnamese-accented speech.148 Similarly, sepa-
rate studies demonstrated that undergraduates who perceived a difficulty in under-
standing L2 accented instructors were “used to the foreign faculty’s accent” by 
“the second or third class session.”149 Simple means, such as sitting close to and 
talking about misunderstandings with individuals with perceived L2 accents, may 
 
144.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 73. 
145.  Id. at 72–73. 
146.  See Aaron Castelán Cargile, Eriko Maeda & Marc Rich, ‘Oh, You Speak English So 
Well!’: U.S. American Listeners’ Perceptions of ‘Foreignness’ Among Nonnative Speakers, 13 J. 
ASIAN AM. STUD. 59, 60–61 (2010) (explaining that listeners often respond with surprise when Asian 
or Latinx Americans speak English). 
147.  Derwing & Munro, supra note 43, at 486. 
148.  Id. at 487. 
149.  Aysel Kavas & Alican Kavas, An Exploratory Study of Undergraduate College Students’ 
Perceptions and Attitudes Toward Foreign Accented Faculty, 42 C. STUDENT J. 879, 887 (2008). 
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possibly improve the comprehension of the listeners.150 In short, “listeners with 
greater experience with L2 speech find it more intelligible.”151 
In terms of systemic racism, the United States is highly segregated. White 
social groups are the most homogenous of any racial group.152 Racial segregation 
limits exposure to a variety of accents. Through exposure and interaction with 
linguistic and racial minorities, majority persons’ comprehension can improve. 
Early exposure to diverse accents can be particularly beneficial to broad compre-
hension.153 Yet, as the aforementioned studies indicate, integrated exposure as an 
adult is helpful as well.154 In this way, racially and linguistically diverse juries 
could serve, at least in a limited way, to help mitigate comprehension limitations 
experienced by many majority persons. 
It is important to recognize the role that racial segregation plays in the perpet-
uation of language barriers between racial groups, as racial bias—restricting who 
lives, works, studies, and socializes together—can actually contribute to accent 
incomprehensibility. In many instances, implicit bias and structural racism might 
be more to blame for incomprehensibility than a speaker’s actual pronunciation. 
Understanding the relationship between accent, race, and racism is imperative 
for recognizing how accent discrimination in jury selection can amount to racial, 
ethnic, and national origin discrimination, which ultimately violates statutory and 
constitutional law.  
III.  
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIATION 
Accent discrimination in jury selection manifests in different ways. It can be 
initiated by the trial court or an attorney—often a prosecutor. The prospective ju-
ror might ultimately be stricken for cause for their supposed lack of English lan-
guage abilities or under a party’s peremptory challenges. Due to the lack of aware-
ness of how linguistic discrimination relates to race discrimination, defense (and 
other) attorneys fail to make proper objections, and judges fail to issue proper rul-
ings. The preceding Section explained the connection between race, racism, and 
 
150.  Id. 
151.  Kennedy & Trofimovich, supra note 124, at 478. Interestingly, this study showed that 
even though experienced listeners demonstrated high actual comprehension of L2 accented speech 
(i.e. their transcribed sentences of L2 speech were nearly 100% accurate), these experienced listeners 
still reported low comprehensibility. Id. at 478–79. 
152.  See Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence, 101 MINN. 
L. REV. 2243, 2293 (2017); Robert P. Jones, Self-Segregation: Why It’s So Hard for Whites to Un-
derstand Ferguson, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2014/08/self-segregation-why-its-hard-for-whites-to-understand-ferguson/378928 
[https://perma.cc/7J2U-L5WE]. 
153.  See Rachel Schmale, Alejandrina Cristia & Amanda Seidl, Toddlers Recognize Words in 
an Unfamiliar Accent After Brief Exposure, 15 DEV. SCI. 732–38 (2012) (for instance, “. . . 24-
month-olds successfully accommodate an unfamiliar accent in rapid word learning after less than 2 
minutes of accent exposure.”). 
154.  See supra notes 145–151. 
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accent discrimination. The current Section looks at how accent can be understood 
as a racial characteristic per se or, alternatively, as a proxy for race. It describes 
the two primary types of accent discrimination in jury selection; notes the impact 
of such discrimination; and, most importantly, outlines the federal laws violated 
by accent discrimination in jury selection. 
A. Juror Disqualification as Race-based Accent Discrimination 
1. Racial Trait or Proxy 
Part II of this Article sought, among other things, to establish that accent is a 
racial characteristic for at least six reasons. First, accent is a characteristic used to 
racially categorize other people. Second, one’s own accent is a source of internal 
racial identification and expressive racial identity. Third, accent is a characteristic 
used to identify people’s race both in the law and in everyday life. Fourth, accent 
is a characteristic that is targeted by overt racism, conveyed through intolerance, 
anger, frustration, and aggression. Fifth, listeners’ unconscious racial biases can 
be aroused by accent, triggering assumptions about the speaker’s lack of compre-
hensibility and worth as an interlocutor, which then leads to avoidance. Finally, 
the fact that foreign accent is mistakenly perceived to exist for people of color but 
not for white people provides further evidence that accent is a racial characteristic. 
As accent is both a salient characteristic that assigns, identifies, and expresses 
race and is a trigger or target for implicit and explicit racism, it would be most 
sensible for the law to directly recognize accent-based discrimination as race dis-
crimination. This approach is not unprecedented. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
can be used to challenge accent-based discrimination in the workplace as direct 
discrimination on the basis of national origin.155 There is no need for a proxy 
analysis or determination whether accent is a pretext for a prohibited form of dis-
crimination. This makes sense because accent itself does not indicate an inability 
to communicate effectively in the English language. Further, aside from certain 
acting roles, few jobs would require a person speak with a particular accent. In the 
jury context, there could never be a legitimate reason to require a juror speak with 
a majority or other accent. Juries are supposed to be representative of the commu-
nity, not just the majority. When an attorney strikes or a judge dismisses a pro-
spective juror of color on the basis of their accent, they are directly discriminating 
on the basis of the individual’s race.  
Some jurisdictions, however, might be more receptive to viewing accent or 
linguistic difference as a proxy for race discrimination. Accent discrimination can 
also be explained by viewing accent as a proxy or stand-in racial trait. A stand-in 
racial or national origin trait is a trait that is central to the minority group’s racial 
identity and classification and is used as a proxy for race or national origin 
 
155.  See, e.g., Fragante v. Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that accent 
discrimination is a form of national origin discrimination); Carino v. Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 
750 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1984); Berke v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 628 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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discrimination.156 For example, skin color is a common racial stand-in trait for 
African Americans.157 The law recognizes that it is racially discriminatory to ex-
clude African Americans on the basis of their skin color. Having dark skin is cen-
tral to one’s race as African American or Black, even though not all African Amer-
icans have dark skin and some people who are not African American have dark 
skin. The same is true for the accent of certain racial groups, such as Latinxs. A 
Hispanic accent is a stand-in trait for their race, ethnicity, and national origin, and 
discrimination on the basis of their accent should be treated as racial, ethnic, and 
national origin discrimination, despite the fact that not all Latinx people have a 
Hispanic accent.  
Antidiscrimination law tends to prohibit discrimination on the basis of stand-
in racial traits or proxies that are immutable.158 For groups like Latinxs, accent is 
not only a stand-in trait for race, ethnicity, and national origin. It can also be a 
rather immutable characteristic for jurors.159 Once a person is an adult—age-eli-
gible to serve on a jury—accent is rarely mutable. Some linguists have gone so far 
as to say that a person “can no more . . . lose his native phonology—his accent—
than he could . . . change the color of his skin.”160 While accent can change during 
childhood, in an adult accent is often fixed, irrespective of a domestic education 
and the speaker’s own efforts.161 While there may be adjustments to pronunciation 
which could increase the intelligibility of speech, accentedness—as distinct from 
intelligibility—often remains.162 Therefore, when analyzing accent discrimina-
tion in jury selection under civil rights laws, accent should be recognized as akin 
to an immutable characteristic. 
From a legal positivist perspective, English language inability could be a law-
ful basis to exclude a prospective juror irrespective of whether accent discrimina-
tion is a racial trait in itself or a proxy for race. This is due to widespread juror 
language requirements. However, asseverations of a lack of English language abil-
ity may also be a pretext for accent-based race discrimination. If the prospective 
juror is able to answer voir dire questions and communicate with court personnel 
and attorneys in the English language, that should be sufficient to satisfy the Eng-
lish language requirement. Bald assertions that counsel or the judge had difficulty 
 
156.  See Matsuda, supra note 43, at 1348; Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race 
Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365, 424 (2006). 
157.  See generally Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 
(2000). 
158.  See Yuracko, supra note 156, at 374 (“Current antidiscrimination doctrine allows em-
ployers to engage in job irrational trait discrimination unless…[t]he trait at issue [is] immutable.”). 
159.  Matsuda, supra note 43, at 1391–92. 
160.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 157. 
161.  Id. at 251. In fact, due to the immutability of accent, many sociolinguists generally agree 
that “accent improvement or reduction programs” are problematic, unhelpful, and actually based on 
stereotypes. See, e.g., Derwing & Munro, supra note 43, at 476, 483 (“‘[A]ccent reduction/elimina-
tion’ programs . . . may do more harm than good.”). 
162.  Derwing & Munro, supra note 43, at 480–81. 
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understanding a prospective juror, or concerns that others might have such diffi-
culties, without evidence in the record—as occurred in the Gould case—should be 
rejected as pretextual accent-based race discrimination. 
2. Forms of Accent Discrimination in Jury Selection 
Accent discrimination in jury selection most often manifests in two ways. 
Prospective jurors of color are either (1) struck for cause on the grounds that they 
did not meet the jurisdiction’s English language juror requirements; or (2) struck 
after a peremptory challenge. The Gould case—where prospective juror Figueroa 
was unjustifiably struck for cause despite a record that clearly demonstrated he 
could speak English sufficiently—is an example of the former. Typically, in these 
situations, counsel or trial judges (whether sincerely or disingenuously) assume or 
purport that the prospective juror of color’s English language abilities are deficient 
or that the juror’s accent impedes communication. The prospective jurors them-
selves believe that their English language abilities are adequate, and there is no 
basis in the record to support an excusal for cause, except for the subjective and 
racialized perceptions of counsel or the judge. Too often, when such prospective 
jurors are challenged for cause, opposing counsel fails to object that the exclusion 
is impermissible race (or ethnic or national origin) discrimination because lan-
guage and accent are wrongly treated as race-neutral characteristics. 
Despite judges’ and counsels’ lack of explicit acknowledgment of the race-
accent connection in a legal context, transcripts and excerpts from voir dire often 
indicate an implicit understanding of the reality that race and accent are closely 
related. However, the significance of race is often defensively and hastily rejected. 
An example of this can be found in the following exchange between the trial judge 
and prospective juror, Figueroa, in the Gould case: 
The Court: …Do you feel like you’ll be able to understand every-
thing that’s said in the courtroom?  
[E.F.]: I think so.  
The Court: Okay, you don’t anticipate any problems understand-
ing what people are saying?  
[E.F.]: No, no, in fact I understand what’s your point. I got a big 
accent. 
The Court: Okay.  
[E.F.]: That when I talk, I know sometimes they tell me— 
The Court: No, no, I understand—I just want to—whenever any-
body talks to me in an accent, and it’s not just Spanish, I often 
inquire whether they can understand English well enough to be a 
juror. So you’re comfortable doing that and that’s fine.163  
 
163.  Gould I, 109 A.3d 968, 979 (2015) (emphasis added). 
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Here, the trial judge seems to recognize that repeatedly questioning a Latinx 
U.S. citizen about his English language abilities is racially inappropriate and de-
fensively clarifies that “it’s not just Spanish,” meaning it is not just Latinx people 
who he probes about their English language abilities. 
Accent discrimination in jury selection also occurs when counsel (usually 
prosecutors) use peremptory strikes to exclude prospective jurors of color. Strik-
ing jurors on the basis of their race has been deemed impermissible, so counsel 
are allowed to challenge the strike of a juror that seems to be in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.164 Astute opposing counsel may suspect that race was 
the motivation for striking a potential juror with an accent, but this motivation may 
not be fully revealed until the prosecutor responds to a Batson challenge. Here, 
the prosecutor might state that the juror was excluded not on the basis of their race 
but due to their accent or difficulty communicating in English. This is demon-
strated in the case of Corona v. Almager: 
The Judge stated as follows . . . “The impression I got from [the 
juror] was—just based upon what I perceived to be a very thick 
accent, I, at times, had some difficulty understanding him. He 
probably immigrated to this country and—is of African descent 
and immigrated to this country. Not the fact that he’s black or im-
migrated, but the difficulty I had in understanding him, notwith-
standing the responses, would, in my mind, probably make him 
not the appropriate juror for this particular case . . . There are a 
series of, from what I recall, some relatively complex issues that 
the jury is going to have to resolve in the matter with regard to the 
sales of the cars and people coming over and what they were do-
ing. I thought there was a basis for [striking the juror] . . .” The 
prosecutor stated that the primary reason he struck juror 28 was 
because the prosecutor inferred a lack of English proficiency from 
the juror’s strong accent. The Court found that, “[d]ifficulty with 
the English language has been held to be a valid race neutral rea-
son to exercise a peremptory strike.”165 
In Corona, the prosecutor and trial judge advanced accent as a purportedly 
race-neutral basis for exclusion, and emphasized—reflecting a defensive aware-
ness of possible racial implications—that the peremptory challenge and disquali-
fication was not due to the prospective juror’s Blackness or immigrant roots.166 
 
164.  A Batson challenge is an opposing party’s objection to a peremptory challenge on the 
grounds that the strike was used to exclude the prospective juror on the basis of a protected charac-
teristic such as race, ethnicity, national origin, or sex. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79, 79 (1986) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not ex-
clude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the false assumption that 
members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors.”). 
165.  Corona v. Almager, Civ. No. 07-2117 BTM (NLS), 2008 WL 6926574, at *6–7 (S.D. 
Cal. Nov. 3, 2008) (emphasis added), aff’d 449 F. App’x 672 (9th Cir. 2011). 
166.  Id. 
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Despite the reality that accent is a racial characteristic and that majority listeners’ 
accent-related inability to comprehend is related to racially biased perceptions, 
courts and attorneys unquestionably accept and advance the accent of people of 
color as a race-neutral basis for juror exclusion. This “practice allows courts to 
accept implausible ‘race-neutral’ explanations for challenges that, in reality, 
highly correlate with race. These decisions also show that the Batson standard is 
a perilous instrument that can be turned into ‘a mere exercise in thinking up any 
rational basis’ for disqualifying linguistic minorities.”167 Accent discrimination in 
these circumstances is a form of race, ethnicity, and national origin discrimination. 
While this Article focuses on accent discrimination against Latinxs, Asian 
Americans, and other people of color perceived as foreign, it should be noted that 
accent discrimination in jury selection can also affect non-immigrant African 
Americans who generally are not considered foreign. For instance, in Young v. 
Florida, Mr. Bayonne, an African American man, was struck from the jury on the 
basis that he had “an extremely thick accent.”168 
Due to Bayonne’s alleged heavy accent, the court questioned: 
“[w]hether he [was] capable of understanding English, I think be-
cause of the very strong accent, I see that as a race neutral reason 
anyway for the State striking at this point, because it does raise 
some questions about his ability, not only to communicate with 
other jurors but also to understand what is happening. I will take 
him out.”169  
Despite the fact that there was no question that Bayonne was a native English 
speaker, the Florida Court of Appeals found that “[h]aving an accent is not limited 
to one particular racial or ethnic group [and] . . . may signal some difficulty with 
the English language which might hinder a potential juror’s ability to understand 
 
167.  Ali, supra note 40, at 254 (discussing linguistic discrimination in California state court 
jury selection). For instance: 
In People v. Jurado, [131 P.3d 400 (Cal. 2006)] the prosecutor challenged the 
juror’s language ability because the juror indicated that she was born in the Phil-
ippines, suggesting that English was not her first language and that she would 
have difficulty understanding spoken English. In People v. Vargas, [No. 
B207146, 2010 WL 119930 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2010), cert. denied (2010)] 
the Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s denial of a Batson objection by a 
Latin[x] defendant, where the prosecutor used a peremptory strike based on the 
juror’s ability to speak Spanish, even though the juror believed his English was 
good enough to fully engage in deliberations. In Vasquez v. Runnels [No. C 05-
4669 MMC PR, 2011 WL 1496040 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011)], juror Liang pos-
sessed a level of proficiency in English sufficient to allow her to participate on 
the jury. However, the District Court held that trial courts have great leeway in 
deciding these issues and, as such, it could not say whether the state court was 
unreasonable in allowing juror Liang’s exclusion or whether it violated peti-
tioner’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
Id. 
168.  Young v. Florida, 744 So.2d 1077, 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
169.  Id. 
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the testimony at trial and to communicate with other jurors during deliberations. 
[Accordingly the court held that accent was] . . . a facially race-neutral [reason] 
for a peremptory strike.”170 The Florida Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s 
exclusion of Bayonne from jury service.171 Thus, while accent discrimination in 
jury selection is primarily a problem for people of color associated with immigra-
tion, it can affect all people of color. This is due to the fact that accent discrimina-
tion usually is more than linguicism: it is a type of race discrimination. 
B. Impact of Juror Language Disenfranchisement 
Accent discrimination in jury selection is an important justice issue because 
it infringes on parties’—particularly criminal defendants’—right to a fair trial. It 
also infringes on prospective jurors’ right to serve on a jury and thus be full citi-
zens. It also affects the actual and perceived fairness of the courts. It has long been 
recognized that juries should be representative of the communities from which 
they are derived.172 However, jury pools and petit juries continually fail to reflect 
their communities in terms of race.173 In comparison to their numbers in the pop-
ulation, white people are overrepresented on juries, while people of color are 
overrepresented as criminal defendants.174 This is a cause for “concern because 
majority-white juries generally spend less time deliberating, consider fewer di-
verse perspectives, commit more errors, and exhibit more racism than racially di-
verse juries, which deliberate more thoroughly, commit fewer errors, diminish the 
expression of racism, and consider more varied perspectives.”175  
Accent and other forms of linguistic discrimination are often overlooked 
causes of the lack of racial diversity on juries. While it is difficult to accurately 
 
170.  Id. 
171.  Id. at 1084. 
172.  See generally Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590–91 (1935). 
173.  Ashish S. Joshi & Christina T. Kline, Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with 
Individual Consequences, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.american
bar.org/groups/litigation/committees/diversity-inclusion/articles/2015/lack-of-jury-diversity-na-
tional-problem-individual-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/8SX4-YKJD]. 
174.  HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 65, 39–40 (1993); see Montré D. Carodine, 
‘The Mis-Characterization of the Negro’: A Race Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment, 84 
IND. L. J. 521, 548 (2009); see also Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial & Ethnic Disparity 
in State Prisons, SENTENCINGPROJECT.ORG (June 14, 2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/pub-
lications/color-of-justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-pris-
ons/#III.%20The%20Scale%20of%20Disparity [https://perma.cc/G2RG-X5DU] (“Latinos are im-
prisoned at a rate that is 1.4 times the rate of whites . . . disparities are particularly high in states such 
as Massachusetts (4.3:1), Connecticut (3.9:1), Pennsylvania (3.3:1), and New York (3.1:1).”). 
175.  Gonzales Rose, 65 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 37, at 812 (citing EDIE GREENE & KIRK 
HEILBRUN, WRIGHTSMAN’S PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 305 (6th ed. 2007); BRUCE EVAN 
BLAINE, UNDERSTANDING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DIVERSITY 101–04 (2d ed. 2013) (summarizing racial 
bias in jury deliberations and verdicts when juries are not sufficiently diverse); Neil Vidmar, The 
North Carolina Racial Justice Act: An Essay on Substantive and Procedural Fairness in Death Pen-
alty Litigation, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1980 (2012)). 
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assess the impact of juror language disenfranchisement,176 approximately 13 mil-
lion U.S. citizens, 11 million of which are people of color, are excluded from jury 
service on the basis that they are limited-English proficient.177 Undoubtedly, 
many more U.S. citizens of color are at risk of exclusion on the basis of their 
accent. The number of people vulnerable to accent discrimination is difficult to 
estimate because accent is a relative construct, and comprehensibility of accents 
is highly subjective.178  
In 2013, 27.2 million U.S.-born citizens spoke a language other than English 
at home. This number has been steadily rising.179 Most of the non-English lan-
guages spoken at home are not European languages,180 and thus it is likely that 
the majority of these U.S. citizens are people of color. Not all persons who speak 
a non-English language at home speak English with an L2 accent, but these num-
bers provide a glimpse into the breadth of the problem. 
Additionally, the population of people of color from groups perceived to be 
foreign provides a ballpark gauge of the extent of potential accent discrimination. 
Latinxs and Asian Americans comprise approximately 18.3 percent and 5.9 per-
cent of the U.S. population, respectively.181 Since linguistic and racial majority 
listeners often misperceive Latinxs and Asian Americans as having foreign ac-
cents, there is clearly a significant number of Latinxs and Asian Americans who 
are, at a minimum, at risk of being perceived to have an accent which might ex-
clude them from jury service. 
C. Sources of Law Prohibiting Accent Discrimination in Jury Selection 
The lack of awareness or disregard for the intrinsic relationship between ac-
cent and race means that attorneys frequently fail to object to trial courts’ for-
 
176.  But cf. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation 
of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
201, 202 (2001) (“[G]iven that Whites are the dominant group in the United States, both in number 
and in power, and that criminal defendants in this country continue to be disproportionately non-
White, White juror bias is more consequential and dangerous than bias demonstrated by Black jurors 
or jurors of other minority groups.”). 
177.  Gonzales Rose, 65 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 37, at 813–14, n.4. 
178.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 251. 
179.  Camille Ryan, Language Use in the United States: 2011, AM. COMTY. SURVEY (Aug. 
2013) https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2013/acs/acs-22.html [https://perma.cc/W922-
ZN5T]. 
180.  See New American Community Survey Statistics for Income, Poverty & Health Insurance 
Available for States & Local Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 14, 2017) https://www.cen-
sus.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2017/acs-single-year.html?CID=CBSM+ACS16 
[https://perma.cc/L8JT-WWDG] (“Data shows the percentage of the nation’s population age 5 and 
older speaking a language other than English at home was 21.6 percent in 2016. New language data 
shows Spanish was by far the largest non-English language in 2016, spoken at home by 40.5 million 
people, or 13.3 percent of the population age 5 or older, followed by Chinese with nearly 3.4 million 
speakers at home and Tagalog with 1.7 million speakers at home.”). 
181. United States Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quick-
facts/fact/table/US/PST045216 [https://perma.cc/93AK-UBJ9] (last updated July 1, 2018). 
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cause disqualifications or prosecutors’ peremptory strikes, even when these dis-
qualifications amount to racial discrimination against prospective jurors of color. 
There are three primary sources of law that should be recognized to prohibit accent 
discrimination in jury selection in both state and federal courts: Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and component of the Fifth Amendment, and the fair cross-section require-
ment of the Sixth Amendment.  
1. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: “No person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”182 Although nei-
ther the text of Title VI nor its legislative history mentions language or accent, 
courts have recognized that linguistic discrimination is prohibited under Title VI 
on the grounds that it is a form of national origin discrimination.183 “[A]ccent and 
national origin are obviously inextricably intertwined . . . ”184 So, too, are accent 
and race.185  
As accent is a central racial characteristic, Title VI should be interpreted to 
recognize that linguistic discrimination is also a form of race discrimination. Re-
stricting accent discrimination challenges to national origin discrimination under 
Title VI is concerning. As I have argued elsewhere:  
By recognizing language discrimination primarily under the na-
tional origin provisions of the Act rather than its race provisions, 
the Act perpetuates th[e] perceived-foreignness problem. It ig-
nores the fact that many targets of language discrimination are na-
tive born, multigenerational, and even indigenous Americans. In 
doing so, the Act seems to signal that language discrimination is 
an immigrant problem or a problem that relates to one’s foreign 
ancestry. It ignores the reality that, for many [populations of color 
such as] Latin[x]s, language discrimination is race discrimina-
tion.186 
When prospective jurors of color are unduly excluded from participation in 
jury service because of their accent, it can amount to a violation of Title VI. All 
federal courts and most state courts receive federal funding; thus, virtually all 
 
182.  42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012 & Supp. V 2018). 
183.  See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568–69 (1974) (holding that linguistic minority stu-
dents had been denied a federally funded educational benefits on the basis of their national origin or 
race in violation of Title VI); Gonzales Rose, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV., supra note 37, at 188. 
184.  Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel Co., 991 F.2d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1993). 
185.  See supra Part II. 
186.  Gonzales Rose, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV., supra note 37 at 210. 
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courts fall under the purview of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.187 Moreover, 
prospective jurors are “participants” within the meaning of Title VI.188 When 
courts unwarrantedly exclude prospective jurors of color on the basis of their ac-
cent, they are excluding them from a program receiving federal funding on the 
basis of their race and national origin in violation of Title VI. 
While Title VI has not been directly utilized to address accent discrimination, 
Title VII has, albeit with limited success.189 Like Title VI, Title VII (which pro-
hibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national 
origin) is silent on linguistic discrimination but has long been recognized to forbid 
it.190 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has explained 
that national origin discrimination includes “the denial of equal employment op-
portunity because . . . an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic charac-
teristics of a national origin group.”191 Accent is a recognized linguistic charac-
teristic protected under Title VII.192 This is not to imply that Title VII protection 
against accent discrimination is perfect. 
The recognition that accent discrimination is a type of linguistic discrimina-
tion, and thus prohibited under Title VII, should be extended to the Title VI con-
text. Under Title VII, the failure to hire or retain employees on the basis of their 
“foreign” accent establishes a prima facie case of national origin discrimina-
tion.193 Job applicants may only be denied a position on the basis of their accent 
if it impedes their ability to perform the essential employment duties; otherwise, 
concerns about communicative ability are merely pretexts for discrimination.194 
Similarly, disqualification of prospective jurors on the basis of their accent, 
 
187.  See STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, CELEBRATING 30 YEARS OF IMPROVING THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN OUR STATE COURTS 9 (2014), http://www.sji.gov/wp/wp-content/up-
loads/SJI-30th-Anniversary-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT93-LUJF] (“Over the past 30 years, SJU 
has awarded grants to state courts in every state, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories.”); 
see also American Bar Association, Federal Court Funding, AMERICANBAR.ORG, 
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/inde-
pendence_of_the_judiciary/federal-court-funding/ [https://perma.cc/W2RC-GYMB] (last updated 
on Oct. 9, 2019). 
188.  Gonzales Rose, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV., supra note 37, at 192 (arguing that prospec-
tive jurors are “participants” in court programs under Title VI by analogizing the similarly worded 
states of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, under which 
prospective jurors have been recognized as participants). 
189.  42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2018). 
190.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012 & Supp. V 2018); see, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., 
Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Saucedo v. Bros. Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 
919, 920–22 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
191.  29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1980) (emphasis added). 
192.  Id. at § 1606.6. 
193.  See, e.g., Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 595–96 (9th Cir. 1989); 
Berke v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 628 F.2d 980, 981 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). 
194.  Fragante, 888 F.2d at 596, 599; Carino v. Univ. of Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 
815, 819 (10th Cir. 1984). 
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despite their abilities to perform the essential duties of jury service, can amount to 
race and national origin discrimination.195 
Citizens should not be excused from jury service when their accent or linguis-
tic difference does not impede their ability to understand court proceedings, com-
municate with fellow jurors, or otherwise serve on a jury. This type of disqualifi-
cation violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, as well as the Constitution. 
2. Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in rele-
vant part, that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”196 There is an implied equal protection component 
to the Fifth Amendment that imposes the same obligation on the federal govern-
ment.197 Exclusion of prospective jurors on the basis of their race, ethnicity, or 
national origin violates equal protection.198 
As explored above, for many people of color, such as Latinxs and Asian 
Americans, accent is a racial characteristic (or alternatively, used as a proxy for 
race, ethnicity, and national origin discrimination). There are some English lan-
guage learners whose English language abilities are not adequate to serve on a jury 
without language accommodation. However, the trial judge’s or counsel’s percep-
tions or claims of incomprehensibility of accent are often the result of racial bias, 
whether conscious or unconscious. Moreover, accent itself is a racial characteris-
tic. Thus, when prospective jurors can speak and understand English sufficiently 
to serve on a jury, their exclusion on the basis of accent or unsubstantiated allega-
tions of English language deficiency may violate the jurors’ right to equal protec-
tion. In criminal cases, the defendant can raise a third-party equal protection claim 
on behalf of excluded prospective jurors.199 
For-cause dismissals from jury service on the basis of accent or related lin-
guistic difference are particularly concerning due to courts’ direct involvement in 
excluding prospective jurors. This is exemplified in the Gould case, where the trial 
judge was the first to question Figueroa’s accent and English language abilities.200 
Then, on the judge’s initiation, the prospective juror was excluded by the court on 
 
195.  See, e.g., People v. Morales, 719 N.E.2d 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that excluding 
a Hispanic juror due to his Spanish accent was pretext for race discrimination). See generally Tom 
McArthur, Worried About Something Else, 60 INT’L J. SOC. LANGUAGE 87, 90–91 (1986) (arguing 
that rules with an adverse effect on individuals with accents or non-English speakers may be a pretext 
for national origin or ethnicity discrimination). 
196.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
197.  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
198.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79–81 (1986). 
199.  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). 
200.  Gould I, 109 A.3d 968, 972 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015). 
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the basis of an unfounded perception that he would be unable to deliberate with 
other jurors in English.201 
Even when a trial court discriminates against a prospective juror on the basis 
of accent, appellate courts frequently fail to provide any remedy. In Gould, the 
Connecticut Court of Appeals found, and the Connecticut Supreme Court af-
firmed, that there was no reasonable basis in the record to support a finding that 
Figueroa’s English language abilities were insufficient.202 Still, the Connecticut 
Court of Appeals and the Connecticut Supreme Court did not find it to be a fun-
damental error requiring a new trial, even though Figueroa had been found to have 
been excluded improperly.203 If the judge had excluded a prospective juror of 
color because he looked like a racial minority, it would have been considered a 
fundamental error likely requiring a new trial.204 The “Constitution forbids strik-
ing even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.”205 However, the 
exclusion of a prospective juror because he sounded like a racial minority was 
treated differently. This is an injustice that is too often overlooked in our legal 
system. 
Equal protection is one of the most important constraints on racial discrimi-
nation in jury selection. The use of facially neutral statutes to exclude racial mi-
norities from the jury box has long been found to violate equal protection. An early 
example of this comes from the 1935 case of Norris v. Alabama, which challenged 
a facially race-neutral statute concerning the jury commission’s selection of names 
of male citizens on the basis of their good moral character, sound judgment, rep-
utation in the community, and English language literacy.206 Purported reliance on 
this statute resulted in the failure to select a single Black man to serve on a jury in 
 
201.  Id. 
202.  Connecticut v. Gould (Gould II), 142 A.3d 253, 256 (2016). 
203.  Id. at 257. 
204.  In the comparable context of peremptory challenges, the error of a judge permitting a 
peremptory strike on a discriminatory basis such as race requires reversal for a new trial. Foster v. 
Chatman, 1136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008) (quoting 
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328–29 (2003)). 
205.  Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478 (quoting United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th 
Cir. 1994)). 
206.  Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590–91 (1935). The relevant statute stated: 
The jury commission shall place on the jury roll and in the jury box the names 
of all male citizens of the county who are generally reputed to be honest and 
intelligent men, and are esteemed in the community for their integrity, good char-
acter and sound judgment, but no person must be selected who is under twenty-
one or over sixty-five years of age, or, who is an habitual drunkard, or who, being 
afflicted with a permanent disease or physical weakness is unfit to discharge the 
duties of a juror or who cannot read English, or who has ever been convicted of 
any offense involving moral turpitude. If a person cannot read English and has 
all the other qualifications prescribed herein and is a freeholder or householder, 
his name may be placed on the jury roll and in the jury box. 
ALA. CODE § 8603 (1923). 
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the county.207 The Supreme Court found this to violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause.208 
Similarly, in Smith v. Texas, the Supreme Court found that, although Black 
residents comprised more than twenty percent of the Harris County, Texas popu-
lation, and despite the fact that up to six thousand Black residents were qualified 
to serve as jurors, only three served on grand juries in the preceding seven 
years.209 The court found that the wide discretion permissible under the county’s 
jury selection statute and implementation plan allowed for discriminatory appli-
cation.210 The Court famously directed that: 
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instru-
ments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative 
of the community. For racial discrimination to result in the exclu-
sion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only vio-
lates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war 
with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representa-
tive government.211 
Today, courts’ inappropriate and overreaching application of English lan-
guage juror requirements results in exclusion of people of color and thwarts “the 
use of juries as instruments of public justice . . . as bod[ies] truly representative of 
the community.”212 Most state courts and all federal courts have English language 
juror requirements.213 These requirements vary greatly in scope, stringency, and 
enforcement. Some jurisdictions require only that jurors understand or speak Eng-
lish, while others require reading and writing abilities.214 Further, enforcement 
and application of English language requirements by courts can be stricter—and 
thus more exclusionary—in practice than required by law.215 
Despite variations in English language juror requirements, none require that 
prospective jurors speak English with a majority accent or speak Standard Amer-
ican English—which is essentially code for the variety of spoken English associ-
ated with the racial majority. However, in practice, there are judges who impose 
such a requirement. Since overtly requiring that jurors speak with a majority ac-
cent would clearly constitute unconstitutional discrimination, judges express 
 
207.  Norris, 294 U.S. at 599. 
208.  Id. at 587. 
209.  Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 128–29 (1940). 
210.  Id. at 131. 
211.  Id. at 130. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Gonzales Rose, 65 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 37, at 815–20 (providing a comprehensive 
overview of state and federal English language requirements). 
214.  Id. at 819–20. 
215.  For instance, a state court’s juror language requirement statute might only require that 
jurors “understand” English, but in practice the court requires jurors also read and write in English. 
Id. at 821. 
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accent exclusion in terms of their own subjective comprehension or perceptions 
of comprehensibility. Either they do not understand the prospective juror, or, as in 
the Gould case, they fear other jurors will not be able to understand the juror or 
that the juror will not understand the proceedings.216 These courts’ determinations 
of whether someone’s accent is too “thick” or “heavy” or otherwise inhibits com-
prehension are often not based on evidence or proper considerations, but rather 
due to unsubstantiated, race-laden, subjective, and inattentive decision-making. 
“The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not 
exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race … or on the 
false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as 
jurors.”217 Here, racialized preconceptions that certain groups of people of color—
such as Latinxs and Asian Americans—cannot speak English sufficiently or have 
unintelligible accents that hinder their ability to serve on juries are, arguably, 
based on the false assumption that members of these races as a group are not qual-
ified for jury service. This violates the guarantee of equal protection. 
In addition to for-cause disqualifications, accent discrimination in jury selec-
tion occurs through peremptory challenges. In both criminal and civil proceedings, 
each party is permitted a certain number of strikes of prospective jurors without 
providing a reason.218 Although the party or counsel need not provide a reason for 
their objection to the juror, they are not constitutionally permitted to strike pro-
spective jurors on the basis of certain protected characteristics.219 Striking a juror 
on the basis of their race, ethnicity, or national origin violates equal protection in 
both criminal220 and civil221 cases. 
Accent-based exclusions violate both the party’s and the prospective juror’s 
rights. “Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a de-
fendant’s right to equal protection, because it denies him the protection that a trial 
by jury is intended to secure.”222 Irrespective of the defendant’s race, like in the 
for-cause context, a criminal defendant can raise a third-party equal protection 
claim.223 In a civil case, a private litigant exercising peremptory challenges qual-
ifies as a state actor and the opposing party has standing to bring a race-based 
equal protection claim on a juror’s behalf.224 
 
216.  Gould I, 109 A.3d 968, 972 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015). 
217.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (internal citations omitted). 
218.  Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 217 (1965). 
219.  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 79–80 (1986). 
220.  Id. 
221.  J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994) (“[W]hether the trial is criminal 
or civil, potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection proce-
dures that are free from state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical 
prejudice.”). 
222.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. 
223.  See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (holding that a white defendant had stand-
ing to challenge prosecutor’s dismissal of Black jurors). 
224.  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 617 (1991). 
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A Batson challenge can be used to object to the use of a peremptory challenge 
to strike a prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose in violation of equal pro-
tection. To establish a prima facie Batson violation, the party asserting the chal-
lenge must show that the facts and circumstances create an inference that the op-
posing party struck the prospective juror because of race, ethnicity, national origin, 
or gender.225 The burden then shifts to the opposing party to advance a neutral 
reason for the strike.226 The court must consider the totality of the evidence to 
evaluate whether the moving party has proved purposeful discrimination.227 
Defense counsel should assert Batson challenges when prospective jurors of 
color are peremptorily struck when accent or other linguistic discrimination might 
have played a role. Often, accent discrimination will not be revealed until the op-
posing party offers its purportedly race-neutral reasoning. This is where English 
language abilities, heavy accent, or concerns about communication barriers might 
be articulated for the first time. Unfortunately, many courts still accept accent as 
a race-neutral reason, despite the reality that accent is often not race-neutral. This 
is where the moving party must be prepared to explain the connection between 
accent, race, and racial discrimination (or alternatively ethnic or national origin 
discrimination). Attorneys, particularly defense counsel, should begin to regularly 
challenge the notion that accent or linguistic difference are race-neutral bases for 
disqualification from jury service. 
3. The Sixth Amendment Fair Cross-section Requirement 
The Impartiality Clause of the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to re-
quire that juries be selected from a fair cross-section of the community.228 This is 
not a new concept. It is related to the notion of a “jury of one’s peers,” which 
appears in the Magna Carta from the early 13th century.229 In modern times, this 
principle is advanced by the requirement that the jury pool from which grand and 
petit juries are selected must be drawn from a fair and representative cross-section 
of the community.230 In Duren v. Missouri, in 1979, the Supreme Court articulated 
 
225.  J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 128–29; Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358 (1991); State v. 
Rigual, 771 A.2d 939, 946 (Conn. 2001). 
226.  Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995). 
227.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. 
228.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing in relevant part that a defendant has a right to an 
“impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”); see, e.g., 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as 
fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”). 
229.  Magna Carta Text, CONST. RIGHTS FOUND., https://www.crf-usa.org/foundations-of-our-
constitution/magna-carta-text.html [https://perma.cc/DHT6-QMP9] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020) 
(“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or 
exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or 
send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of the land.”). 
230.  See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986). 
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the test to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement.231 
Duren dealt with challenges to a statute allowing women, upon their request, an 
automatic exemption from jury service.232 The Court found that the statute re-
sulted in an underrepresentation of women, which violated the impartiality stand-
ard imposed by the Constitution’s fair cross-section requirement.233 
To prove a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement the de-
fendant must show:  
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group 
in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in ve-
nires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in 
relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) 
that this underrepresentation is due to the systematic exclusion of 
the group in the jury-selection process.234 
Unlike an equal protection claim or Batson challenge, a Sixth Amendment 
fair cross-section claim does not require a showing of discriminatory intent. The 
focus is on systemic exclusion. 
The overuse of English language juror requirements, or peremptory chal-
lenges based on accent or unsubstantiated allegations of language barriers, may 
rise to a violation of the fair cross-section requirement. For instance, in the Gould 
case, the jurisdiction from which the jury pool was derived was approximately 
40% Puerto Rican, with an additional 5% of the residents being non-Puerto Rican 
Latinx.235 The assumption that jurors would be so unfamiliar with a Puerto Rican 
accent that deliberations would be hindered provides insights into the jury pool 
and selection process. It indicates that, in the trial judge’s experience, Puerto Ri-
cans and other Latinxs are not represented on juries and that persons who interact 
with Puerto Ricans and Latinxs are not represented on juries in this jurisdiction. 
This reflects a racialized judgment about who deserves to be a juror and stand in 
judgment of their fellow citizen. 
The exclusion of Figueroa on the grounds that fellow jurors might not under-
stand him appears to have been an act of judicial deference to the racially-driven 
communicative preferences of majority jurors. That is not a legitimate concern. 
The record reflects that the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, and court reporter 
had no real difficulty understanding Figueroa.236 Moreover, deliberations are not 
 
231.  Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
232.  Id. at 360. 
233.  Id. 
234.  Id. at 364. 
235.  American Community Survey Demographic and Housing Estimates: New Britain City, 
Conn., 2014 1-Year Estimate Data Profile, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/ta-
ble?d=ACS%201-Year%20Estimates%20Data%20Profiles&table=DP05&tid=ACSDP1Y
2014.DP05&g=0400000US09_1600000US0950370&hidePreview=true&y=2014&vintage=2014 
[https://perma.cc/HM5P-YP6Q] (last visited Apr. 21, 2020). 
236.  See supra notes 6–12 and accompanying text. 
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immediate. During the course of a trial and before jury deliberations, the jurors 
are not supposed to talk about the case. Instead, they talk about weather, sports, 
family, current events, and daily life. Through these conversations they would 
learn to understand each other’s accents.237 If they did not understand something, 
they could simply ask the person to repeat or clarify.238 
In the Gould case, one wonders if actual and de facto English language re-
quirements were being used in the jurisdiction to systematically exclude Latinxs 
from the jury pool and petit juries. Attorneys, especially defense counsel, should 
become aware of the exclusionary trends of the jurisdictions in which they prac-
tice. Attorneys need to understand that accent is a racial trait and that perceived 
intelligibility of accent is often a race problem rather than a linguistic problem. 
Members of the bench and bar need to stop taking claims of English language 
deficiency and incomprehensible accent at face (facially neutral) value. 
In addition to the legal challenges set forth above, internal reforms of the court 
system are necessary to address accent discrimination in jury selection. As demon-
strated in the Gould case, judges can perpetuate accent discrimination. These re-
forms—which are beyond the scope of this Article—could include increased edu-
cation about racialized linguistic difference, implicit bias training on linguicism, 
and development of evidence-based best practices concerning accent discrimina-
tion. Further, the problem of accent discrimination in jury selection demonstrates 
the need for juror language accommodation. 
IV.  
STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACCENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE NEED FOR 
JUROR LANGUAGE ACCOMMODATION 
Accent discrimination in jury selection is an important issue in itself; how-
ever, it also reveals broader concerns about who is considered and permitted to be 
a full citizen in the United States. This section situates accent discrimination into 
the larger racial justice problems posed by juror language disenfranchisement. It 
exposes the breadth of linguistic discrimination in jury selection and remedial po-
tential of juror language accommodation. 
A. Situating Accent Discrimination into the Structure of Race  
The narrative of the American Dream is one where all persons, irrespective 
of their immigrant heritage or race, can become fully “American.” The English 
language is touted as the mechanism to achieve full citizenship. It is considered 
the great equalizer.239 However, the rewards of language assimilation are often a 
 
237.  See supra notes 147–151 and accompanying text. 
238.  See Kavas & Kavas, supra note 149, at 887 (explaining that students not only got used to 
an instructor’s L2 accent by class session 2 or 3, but also students were able to improve comprehen-
sion by discussing misunderstandings with the instructor or simply asking her or him to slow down). 
239.  Sean Kennedy, Learning English should be part of American experience, CNN OPINION 
(Sep. 17, 2015, 3:13 P.M.), https://www.cnn.com/2015/09/17/opinions/kennedy-english-language-
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fiction. The fallacy that English language attainment guarantees full citizenship is 
exposed by the fact that perceived-to-be-foreign people of color from all linguistic 
backgrounds are at risk of being rejected from jury service on the purported basis 
of language. This includes limited-English proficient speakers; fluent English 
speakers who have minority accents; fluent English speakers who have majority 
accents but are mistakenly perceived to have minority accents; and fully bilingual 
(or multilingual) individuals irrespective of their accents. 
In the current legal landscape, English language juror prerequisites could be 
applied to disenfranchise people of color across the entire spectrum of linguistic 
ability. English language juror requirements outright exclude approximately 11 
million limited-English proficient U.S. citizens of color—the majority of whom 
are Latinx—from the jury box, even though they would be able to serve with juror 
language accommodation. Even when prospective jurors speak English fluently, 
they are sometimes excluded on the basis of their accent, as exemplified by the 
Gould case.240 Further, since perceptions about accent are highly subjective and 
racialized, even native English speakers might be misperceived to have heavy for-
eign accents and consequently excluded or discouraged from jury service.241  
Questioning or targeting Latinxs, Asian Americans, or other groups consid-
ered foreign for English language screening is problematic in itself. It could en-
courage these individuals to opt out of jury service even when they are fully qual-
ified to serve. Policies that permit or indirectly encourage underrepresented groups 
to opt out of jury service can violate the Constitution.242 For instance, in Duren, 
the Supreme Court held that a Missouri statute allowing women to request an au-
tomatic exemption from jury service resulted in a systematic underrepresentation 
of women on jury venires in violation of the impartiality standard implied by the 
Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement.243 
The juror language disenfranchisement of people of color extends beyond 
those who are English language learners or perceived to have a minority accent. 
Bilingual English-Spanish Latinxs have been struck from juries on the basis of 
their bilingualism, irrespective of their accent or English language communication 
abilities. 
In Hernandez v. New York, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, upheld 
a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude Latinx jurors on the basis 
of their bilingual abilities.244 The Hernandez case dealt with the criminal trial of 
a Latinx defendant from a heavily Spanish-speaking Latinx jurisdiction.245 
 
immigration/index.html [https://perma.cc/6NDU-2UTA] (“The most productive way to counter 
[racist and xenophobic] sentiments is to make a serious effort to help immigrants assimilate through 
school and work. . . . English is the fastest path to that goal . . . ”). 
240.  Gould I, 109 A.3d 968 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015). 
241.  See discussion supra Part II.E. 
242.  Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 366–67 (1979). 
243.  Id. 
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Evidence at trial was to include Spanish-language testimony.246 The prosecutor 
used peremptory challenges to exclude all of the Latinx prospective jurors.247 In 
response to defense counsel’s Batson challenge, the prosecutor claimed that he 
struck two of the Latinx jurors, not due to their race, but because they were Eng-
lish-Spanish bilingual.248 The prosecutor maintained that he was not certain these 
prospective jurors would follow the English language translation of the Spanish 
language evidence.249 The prosecutor acknowledged that he “believe[d] that in 
their heart[s]” the prospective Latinx jurors would try to follow the English lan-
guage translation, but he supposedly felt there was still uncertainty if they could, 
in actuality, accept the translation.250 
For Latinxs, and other people of color associated with immigration, being 
fluent in the English language is not enough to ensure that you are deemed lin-
guistically sufficient or appropriate to serve on a jury. English fluency cannot re-
move the perceptions of foreignness that prevent full citizenship. English is not an 
equalizer, but instead a color-blind shield used by litigants, attorneys, and judges 
to conceal racial, ethnic, and national origin discrimination. While outright dis-
crimination on the grounds that an individual looks “different” than the white ma-
jority is proscribed, the same discrimination justified on the basis that the individ-
ual sounds “different”—even when they do not—is too frequently tolerated in our 
courts. 
The Hernandez case reveals the extent of juror language disenfranchisement 
and the unsettled state of the law in recognizing how linguistic discrimination can 
be a form of race discrimination. The individual opinions in the Hernandez case 
reflect a variety of perspectives on the relationship between race and language. 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented in Hernandez and recog-
nized the complex relationship between language and race.251 Justice Stevens 
found the prosecutor’s purported reason for striking the bilingual Latinx prospec-
tive jurors was “insufficient to dispel the existing inference of racial animus” be-
cause, amongst other reasons, the justification “would inevitably result in a dis-
proportionate disqualification of Spanish-speaking venirepersons.”252 He noted 
that “[a]n explanation that is ‘race-neutral’ on its face is nonetheless unacceptable 
if it is merely a proxy for a discriminatory practice.”253 Here, English-Spanish 
bilingualism was a proxy, or perhaps—more accurately—a pretext, for 
 
Rethinking Hernandez v. New York, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 783, 791–92 (2010). 
246.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 356–57. 
247.  Id. at 356, 358. 
248.  Id. at 356–57. 
249.  Id. 
250.  Id. at 356. 
251.  See id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Each of these reasons considered alone might 
not render insufficient the prosecutor’s facially neutral explanation. In combination, however, they 
persuade me that his explanation should have been rejected as a matter of law.”). 
252.  Id. 
253.  Id. 
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discrimination. This is particularly apparent, when only Latinx prospective jurors 
were questioned and excluded on the basis of their bilingualism when non-Latinx 
prospective jurors might have understood the Spanish language as well.254 
On the other hand, the concurring opinion by Justice O’Connor, joined by 
Justice Scalia, took a traditionalist perspective that “[n]o matter how closely tied 
or significantly correlated to race the explanation for a peremptory strike may be, 
the strike does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on 
race.”255 
The Hernandez plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy took a middle ground. 
Justice Kennedy recognized that linguistic discrimination can be linked to race or 
ethnicity so as to implicate a violation of equal protection, but ultimately upheld 
the use of peremptory strikes of bilingual prospective jurors.256 Although Justice 
Kennedy did not find a sufficient link between race or ethnicity and language in 
that instance, he observed that “[i]t may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in 
some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, 
should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis.”257 
Justice Kennedy noted that a “locality” might exist where a “significant percent-
age of the Latin[x] population speaks fluent Spanish” and prefers communicating 
in Spanish over English.258 In such a locality, “[a] prosecutor’s persistence in the 
desire to exclude Spanish-speaking jurors . . . could be taken into account in de-
termining whether to accept a race-neutral explanation for the challenge.”259 
The lack of recognition that linguistic discrimination in jury selection is often 
race discrimination is particularly disconcerting because, after voting, jury service 
is arguably the most important responsibility of citizenship.260 Participation in ju-
ries and the administration of justice “reaffirms the promise of equality under the 
law—that all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to 
 
254.  Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 53–54 (1993) (noting that only Latinx jurors were asked about 
their fluency in Spanish). One in five K-12 students are enrolled in foreign language courses, and of 
those students almost 70% are learning Spanish. Corey Mitchell, Just 20 Percent of K-12 Students 
Are Learning a Foreign Language, EDUC. WK. (June 20, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/arti-
cles/2017/06/21/just-20-percent-of-k-12-students-are.html [https://perma.cc/9N5T-HFM8]. Addi-
tionally, the vast majority of universities in the country offer Spanish courses, and close to 800,000 
students each year are enrolled in such courses. MANEL LACORTE & JESÚS SUÁREZ-GARCÍA, 
TEACHING SPANISH AT THE UNIVERSITY LEVEL IN THE UNITED STATES 5–6 (2016), http://cervantes-
observatorio.fas.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/018_report_teaching_spanish_university_us.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/475U-ANQ7].  
255.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
256.  Justice Kennedy observed that a person’s language can elicit a variety of responses from 
others, ranging from “distance and alienation, to ridicule and scorn. . . . [T]he latter type all too often 
result[s] from or initiate[s] racial hostility.” Id. at 371. 
257.  Id. at 371. 
258.  Id. at 363–64. 
259.  Id. at 364. 
260.  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991); Gonzales Rose, 65 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 
37, at 829. 
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take part directly in our democracy.”261 While our law formally forbids the exclu-
sion of citizens from jury service on the basis of race, ethnicity, and national 
origin, racial exclusions can be achieved simply by couching the exclusion in 
terms of language ability, whether that is English language proficiency, accent, or 
multilingualism. As reflected in the Hernandez opinions, aside from the formalis-
tic traditionalist perspective, moderate and liberal justices recognize that language 
can be a racial characteristic, and linguistic discrimination can be a pretext for race 
discrimination. 
English language is both a formal and de facto requirement for American cit-
izenship. For instance, to become a naturalized citizen of the United States, a per-
son needs to demonstrate an “understanding of the English language, including 
the ability to read, write, and speak” English.262 Although there is no official fed-
eral language, English is the dominant language of education, commerce, and gov-
ernment.263 Aside from its practical significance, the English language in the 
United States has tremendous symbolic importance. In a crude vernacular, speak-
ing English is referred to as “speaking American,” implying that those who speak 
English in a way that deviates from white Americans are foreign. Speaking Eng-
lish is promulgated as the key to full citizenship and success, especially by politi-
cal conservatives.264 However, even when a Latinx or Asian American speaks 
English fluently, they can still be foreclosed from jury service on the basis of lan-
guage because of an actual or perceived accent or bilingual ability.  
Juror language disenfranchisement and the lack of legal remediation also re-
veal how our legal system and civil rights laws are not fully equipped to deal with 
changing racial demographics. Latinxs are the largest racial and linguistic minor-
ity group in the United States.265 Our civil rights law must be interpreted and 
crafted to address the ways that racial discrimination materializes against Latinxs 
in the United States. After Mexico, the United States has the largest number of 
Spanish-speaking people in the world.266 The vast majority of these Spanish-
speaking persons are Latinx. English language requirements and policies often 
target Latinxs.267 Hispanic accents are considered inferior, offensive, and 
 
261.  J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 
407). 
262.  Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 § 312(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1423(a)(1) (2018). 
263.  See, e.g., Bryan Lufkin, What is the future of English in the US?, BBC (Aug. 8, 2018), 
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[https://perma.cc/77XA-MZWW]. 
264.  JUAN F. PEREA, RICHARD DELGADO, ANGELA HARRIS & STEPHANIE WILDMAN, RACE AND 
RACES: CASES & RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA, 781–91 (3d ed. 2015); Jeffrey M. Jones, Most 
in U.S. Say It’s Essential That Immigrants Learn English, GALLUP (Aug. 9, 2013), https://news.gal-
lup.com/poll/163895/say-essential-immigrants-learn-english.aspx [https://perma.cc/DY3M-7N9U]. 
265.  Cristina M. Rodríguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a Comprehensive 
Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 188 (2001). 
266.  See Burgen, supra note 35. 
267.  See Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cul-
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inappropriate,268 reflecting how racism morphs into accent preference. Linguistic 
discrimination has been a primary way that Latinxs have experienced racial dis-
crimination. Further, with increasing leniency towards racism and xenophobia in 
the Trump era,269 all people of color perceived as foreign are at increased risk of 
being subject to linguistic discrimination. 
B. Juror Language Accommodation 
The problem of accent discrimination in jury selection, coupled with the fact 
that all persons of color perceived to be foreign are at risk of potential juror lan-
guage disenfranchisement, bespeaks the need for juror language accommoda-
tion.270 Juror language accommodation is language assistance through interpreta-
tion and translation services provided to individuals who need these services to 
fully participate as jurors. Juror language accommodation is not a new idea. It has 
a long history in the Anglo-American legal system. In the common law, mixed 
linguistic juries were utilized for several centuries.271 In the Southwestern United 
States, from the 19th through the early 20th centuries, monolingual Spanish speak-
ers frequently served on juries through the assistance of interpreters.272  
 
HASTINGS L. J., supra note 37, at 818; see also id. (“Often the popular movements that prompt leg-
islative action are undeniably racist and anti-Latin[x]. These actions are motivated by a ‘fear of a 
Hispanic takeover’ and ‘questions about the intelligence and values of Latin American immigrants,’ 
and are pursued to further ‘missions of “race betterment.’”) (quoting Lupe S. Salinas, Immigration 
and Language Rights: The Evolution of Private Racist Attitudes into American Public Law and Pol-
icy, 7 NEV. L. J. 895 (2007); Philip C. Aka & Lucinda M. Deason, Culturally Competent Public 
Services and English-Only Laws, 53 HOW. L. J. 53, 85 n. 207 (2009)). 
268.  LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 43, at 73, 85. 
269.  See, e.g., US Racism on the Rise, UN Experts Warn in Wake of Charlottesville Violence, 
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Currently, juror language accommodation is a state constitutional right in the 
state courts of New Mexico.273 New Mexico has developed detailed procedures 
for juror language accommodation over the past 150 years.274 Certified court in-
terpreters are governed by the New Mexico courts’ Non-English-Speaking Juror 
Guidelines.275 Under these guidelines, all parties and jurors are informed of the 
interpreters’ role, and the interpreters take an oath in open court that they “will 
only provide translation services to the non-English-speaking juror and will not 
otherwise participate in the trial or jury deliberations.”276 Throughout the trial and 
jury deliberations, the interpreter provides simultaneous, consecutive interpreta-
tion, as well as translation services.277 
A parallel juror language accommodation service is mandated for all federal 
and state courts for hard of hearing and deaf jurors.278 Sign language interpretation 
for these jurors is mandated by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.279 Hard of hearing and deaf jurors, 
as well as non-English speaking jurors in New Mexico, have successfully served 
as jurors.280 There are current models that could be followed to implement juror 
language accommodation programs in courts throughout the United States. 
In some respects, discussing juror language accommodation in the same 
breath as accent discrimination is not appropriate. By definition, accent discrimi-
nation is discrimination on the basis of (perceived) pronunciation and not actual 
language (in)ability. In other words, victims of accent discrimination do not need 
language accommodation. They need racially tolerant and open ears, minds, and 
hearts. However, there may be some instances on the margins where concerns 
about an English-language learners’ linguistic abilities are legitimate, and the juror 
may require assistance to serve. Just as importantly, the option of juror language 
accommodation could foreclose accent discrimination. Judges and counsel, who 
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SERVICES (June 16, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/disability/effective-
communication/index.html [https://perma.cc/MMH7-TCFD] (explaining that both deaf and hard of 
hearing individuals can be covered under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act). 
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believed that a potential juror’s accent is too “thick” or that their way of speaking 
English indicates a lack of requisite fluency, would be tasked with offering juror 
language accommodation services rather than disqualification and exclusion. The 
availability of such services may also deter judges and counsel from using accent 
or language ability as a pretextual means to make race-based for-cause or peremp-
tory challenges during jury selection. 
Juror language accommodation would mitigate juror language disenfran-
chisement and serve the purpose of inclusion. Juries are vital to our legal system. 
Thomas Jefferson considered juries to be “the only anchor ever yet imagined by 
man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”281 
Alexis de Tocqueville observed that “[a]ll of the privileges of a complete and free 
society are guaranteed and reinforced [in the United States] by the fact that all 
citizens have a right, no matter who their opposition, to have their rights heard 
before a jury of their peers. This secures to America its unique form of democratic 
government and the freedoms that abound.”282 The Supreme Court has declared 
that juries must be “a body truly representative of the community”283 so that the 
“common sense judgment of the community” can guard against arbitrary abuses 
of power.284 
In this nation of immigrants, comprised of people of diverse races, ethnicities, 
and national origins, our courts and legislatures need to take action to ensure that 
juries represent the communities from which they are derived. This should entail 
both enforcing current law and policies that prohibit linguistic discrimination in 
jury selection, as well as enacting new laws and policies—such as universal juror 
language accommodation—which value diversity and inclusion in the jury system. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Juror language disenfranchisement bars millions of U.S. citizens of color 
from the jury box. Accent discrimination in jury selection is one of the most per-
nicious and unjustifiable forms of this exclusion. Yet, very few judges, lawyers, 
scholars, and others are even aware of this problem. The innate connection be-
tween accent, race, and racism is also overlooked. Accent discrimination in jury 
selection harms litigants, criminal defendants, prospective jurors, and the per-
ceived and actual fairness and legitimacy of the courts. Juries are central to dem-
ocratic self-governance285 and must be representative of the community.286 At a 
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time in our nation’s history when racism and xenophobia are increasingly bla-
tant,287 there might be an inclination to let pass seemingly color-blind—or, more 
accurately, color-deaf—discrimination. Ultimately, racial discrimination by the 
ears is just as injurious and unjust as racial discrimination by the eyes. It is imper-
ative that our legal system recognizes and remediates accent and all other forms 
of linguistic discrimination in the jury selection process. 
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